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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
As Woodrow Wilson traveled the presidential campaign trail in 191 1, he confided to
one of his staff members that he was "definitely and irreconcilably opposed to woman
suffrage; woman's place was in the home, and the type of woman who took an active part
in the suffrage agitation was totally abhorrent to him." 1 Just six years later, though,
halfway through his second term, he pleaded with the United States Senate to pass the
federal woman suffrage amendment. In the midst of a world war and with significant
mid-term elections looming just days away, Wilson took the unprecedented step of
personally injecting his voice into the Senate debate over woman suffrage. The future
direction of the nation rests on granting women the right to vote, he argued, because "we
shall need their moral sense to preserve what is right and fine and worthy in our system
of life as well as to discover just what it is that ought to be purified and reformed.
Without their counselings we shall only be half wise."2
What had transpired during the first six years of his presidency to bring about such a
dramatic change in Wilson's position? How had the federal suffrage amendment been
elevated to an issue of such importance that the President felt compelled to personally
intervene with Congress on its behalf? The purpose of this thesis is to answer that
question using the framework of executive influence. Envisioning executive influence as
1
Frank Parker Stockbridge, "How Woodrow Wilson Won His Nomination," Current
History 20 (1924): 567.
2
Congress, Senate, President Woodrow Wilson's message to the U.S. Senate urging
passage of the suffrage amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 65
lh
Congress, 2
nd
sess.,
Congressional Record (30 September 1918), vol. 56, pt. 1, 10900-10901.
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a two-way exchange, I seek to understand the array offerees that pressured Wilson and
the extent to which he was able to exert authority over Congress and voters.
The 19th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States was signed into law on
August 26, 1920. In the month that followed, Carrie Chapman Cart, president of the
National American Woman Suffrage Association (NAWSA), composed letters to the
chairmen of both the Republican and Democratic National Committees summarizing the
performance of each party in the long struggle for woman suffrage. In her letter to the
Democratic chairman, she wrote, "There is one important Democratic factor which
should be included in the record and that is the fearless and able sponsorship of the
amendment by the leader of your party, the President of the United States."3 Cart was
convinced that President Woodrow Wilson's support for a federal suffrage amendment
had been a crucial element in its eventual passage.
Wilson's relationship to the 19th Amendment has received much consideration from
suffrage historians. Women who personally participated in the campaign authored the
earliest suffrage histories, published in the decades immediately following passage of the
federal amendment. The manner in which these accounts described Wilson's role in
securing the amendment depended on whether the authors had worked with NAWSA or
with the smaller and more militant National Woman's Party (NWP). Both groups agreed
that Wilson became an advocate and that his support helped secure the necessary votes in
Congress and, later, in the state ratification campaigns. They disagreed sharply, however,
on the cause of his conversion. Those affiliated with NAWSA insisted that Wilson was
3
The History ofWoman Suffrage, ed. Ida Husted Harper, 6 vols., vol. 5 (New York:
Arno and the New York Times, 1969), 648. Hereafter referred to as HWS.
2
won over to the cause by their organization's tireless campaigning along nonpartisan
lines and women's war service. In contrast, women affiliated with the NWP argued that,
as a result of their campaign to "hold the party in power responsible" and the militant
tactics they employed, Wilson recognized the urgency for passing the suffrage
amendment under a Democratic administration. Furthermore, NWP activists adamantly
believed that NAWSA abandoned the cause of suffrage during World War I and focused
all of their efforts on war service, thus leaving the NWP to shoulder the brunt of the
suffrage work. Although these accounts make clear that the participants were aware of
the manner in which woman suffrage had become entangled with other political
objectives like prohibition, progressive labor protection laws, and Southern voting
qualifications designed to disenfranchise potential black voters, they rarely connect
Wilson's actions to those other issues.4
Wilson scholars have paid relatively little attention to the way the suffrage campaign
weighed in among the other issues of Wilson's Administration. Sadly, one could browse
through hundreds of monographs on Wilson's foreign and domestic policy and not realize
4
Early suffrage histories written by NAWSA members include HWS, which was
originally published in 1922 and Carrie Chapman Catt and Nettie Rogers Shuler, Woman
Suffrage and Politics: The Inner Story ofthe Suffrage Movement (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1923). The first full history of the NWP, published in 1921, was Inez
Hayes Irwin, The Story ofthe Woman 's Party. It was republished in 1977 as The Story of
Alice Paul and the National Woman 's Party (Fairfax, Virginia: Denlinger's Publishers,
Ltd., 1977). Another first-hand NWP account was Doris Stevens, Jailedfor Freedom
(New York: Liveright Publishing Company, 1920). The first three of these accounts
discuss the manner in which the "liquor interests" campaigned against suffragists in state
suffrage campaigns and during the ratification process. Additionally, they acknowledge
the powerful race issue as it deterred Southern Democrats from supporting the federal
suffrage amendment. Stevens' account is more focused on the experience of the pickets
and Wilson's reaction to them. None of these accounts, however, directly link Wilson's
level of support for suffrage with pressure he received from those opposed to suffrage
because of its relationship to other progressive issues.
3
that one-half of the nation's population gained the right to vote during his administration.
His primary biographer, Arthur S. Link, mentions Wilson's interaction with suffragists
only a few times in his five-volume history of Wilson's two terms. His most extensive
discussion concerns Wilson's decision to vote in favor of the state suffrage referendum in
New Jersey in 1915 - a pronouncement that Link contends was intimately tied to the
president's simultaneous choice to announce his plans to remarry just a little more than a
year after the death of his first wife. While Wilson's affirmative vote in New Jersey was
certainly significant, Link's over-simplified explanation of the decision fails to connect
this action to the President's broader experience with the suffrage movement. 5 Wilson's
later advocacy of the federal suffrage amendment is almost entirely absent from Link's
account. Biographies focused on Wilson's personal life do not devote much more time to
the suffrage issue than those centered on his foreign policy. Much scholarly work has
been done on Wilson's relationship to progressive legislation, but suffrage is almost
entirely excluded from those investigations. 6 This thesis is an attempt to at least partially
fill the suffrage movement void in the existing Wilson scholarship while also contributing
a broader picture of Wilson's political conversion to the body of suffrage history.
In the first "objective" suffrage history written by a nonparticipant, Eleanor Flexner
acknowledges the importance of Wilson's role in the suffrage campaign. In Century of
5
Arthur S. Link, Wilson: Confusions and Crises, 1915-1916 (Princeton, New Jersey
Princeton University Press, 1964), 1-14.
6 More personal biographies such as August Heckscher, Woodrow Wilson (New
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1991) and Phyllis Lee Levin, Edith and Woodrow: The
Wilson White House (New York: Scribner, 2001) mention Wilson's wives' distaste for
women's political participation and, later, the actions of the NWP. However, neither
author devotes more than a few sentences to Wilson's reaction to suffrage pressure. His
interaction with Congress on the issue is completely absent from these accounts.
4
Struggle, originally published in 1959, she carefully assesses the influence both the NWP
and NAWSA had on the President. Flexner concludes that the real contribution of the
NWP was to bring the federal amendment back to a central position in the suffrage
movement through the work they did between 1913 and 1916. Beginning in January,
1917, they began to use militant tactics that included picketing in front of the White
House, lighting bonfires in which Wilson's speeches about democracy were burned, and
conducting hunger strikes after they had been arrested. Flexner asserts that the militant
phase ofNWP activity probably did not help the cause and certainly did not endear
suffragists to Wilson. She concludes that NAWSA, under the strict control of Catt and
her moderate, nonpartisan approach, found the most effective path to win over the
president and eventually gain the vote. 7
Importantly, Flexner notes that winning the support of the President was not the only
challenge suffragists faced. Even with his support, the suffrage amendment was defeated
twice in the Senate (first in October 1918 and again in February 1919) before finally
passing by the slim margin of two votes in June 1919. Flexner lists the multitude of other
issues facing elected representatives including Southern fears that woman suffrage
threatened white supremacy and pressure from the liquor and textile industries who
feared that woman voters would support reformist legislation such as prohibition and
protective child labor laws. In pointing out the influence of these outside factors on
7
Eleanor Flexner and Ellen Fitzpatrick, Century ofStruggle: The Woman's Rights
Movement in the United States, Enlarged ed. (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press, 1996), 262-268.
8
Ibid., 286-297.
s
Congressmen, Flexner neglected to explain the impact they had on Wilson's decision to
withhold or exert executive influence.
Suffrage histories written in the wake of Century ofStruggle followed the trend
Flexner established. Most historians agree that Wilson was converted to the cause by
late- 1917 and thereafter played a significant role in securing the amendment. The bulk of
the scholarly disagreement centers on the competing influence ofNAWSA and the NWP
on Wilson's conversion, paying relatively little attention to Wilson's personal connection
to other salient issues such as Southern race fears and powerful business interests.9
One notable exception to this trend is David Morgan's Suffragists and Democrats:
The Politics of Woman Suffrage in America. Morgan carefully examines Wilson's
choices about when, where, and with whom he tried to exert his influence in favor of the
federal suffrage amendment. In a more thorough manner than many others, Morgan
places Wilson's actions in the context of sectional rivalries, economic realities, and party
Accounts that spend the balance of their discussion of Wilson on how he was
affected by either NAWSA or the NWP include Christine A. Lunardini, From Equal
Suffrage to Equal Rights: Alice Paul and the National Woman's Party, 1910-1928 (New
York: New York University Press, 1986) and Susan D. Becker, The Origins ofthe Equal
Rights Amendment: American Feminism between the Wars (Westport, Connecticut:
Greenwood Press, 1981). Both of these works argue that, more so than any maneuvers
by NAWSA, the anti-Democratic campaigns led by the NWP during both the 1914 and
1916 elections effectively convinced the President that his party would suffer drastic
consequences unless he began to advocate for the federal amendment. William O'Neill,
in Everyone was Brave: A History ofFeminism in America (New York: The New York
Times Book Co., 1971) argues that it was NAWSA's more gentle persuasive approach
that converted Wilson. He criticizes the NWP for their policy of "holding the party in
power responsible" and damaging the cause through their militant actions. O'Neill
contends that the NWP was an embarrassment to both NAWSA and Wilson by
continuing to focus their attacks on him after he had already come out in support of
suffrage. Like Flexner, though, O'Neill does not examine the effect of the myriad of
connected political issues on Wilson's willingness to wade into the suffrage fray.
6
politics.
10
Published in 1972, Morgan's account does not enjoy the benefit of more recent
scholarship on the goals of the suffrage leaders or on Wilson's state of mind during his
second term in office. Additionally, he discounts the importance ofNAWSA's active
participation in war service on Wilson's decision to serve as an advocate for the 19th
Amendment.
This thesis builds on Morgan's foundation by incorporating both the suffrage and
Wilson scholarship of the last three decades. I argue that suffrage became an issue of
tremendous political value during Wilson's second term. Not out of a sense ofjustice or
any type of feminist conversion, but out of knowledge of political reality, Wilson came to
support the federal amendment. The degree to which he came to personally regard
women as deserving members of the franchise is difficult to discern. Comparing his deep
distaste for women in politics during his academic years and his early political career
with the tremendous level of support he gave to the suffrage movement during the final
push for passage of the federal amendment, it certainly appears as if his experiences with
women in the public sphere at least partially mitigated his personal opposition to their
participation in politics.
Regardless of the degree of his private conversion, though, his public support of the
principle of suffrage was key in several state referenda, thereby increasing the number of
Congressmen from suffrage states and improving the chances of successfully passing the
federal amendment. He also succeeded in securing the votes of several legislators
through personal appeals. There were limits, though, to Wilson's ability to influence
10 David Morgan, Suffragists and Democrats: The Politics of Woman Suffrage in
America (Michigan: Michigan State University Press, 1972). See especially Chapter 1 1
:
Liquor, Cotton, and Suffrage, p. 155-178.
7
more
a more
events in Congress. Included in this thesis is a thorough examination of his inability to
secure the needed two votes in the Senate during the October 1918 and February 1919
Senate debates.
Alongside the exploration of the ability of the President to persuade Congress, I
assess the impact of the various factions that pushed and pulled at Wilson over the
suffrage issue. I develop the argument that the NAWSA strategy was infinitely
successful at gaining the President's support than that of the NWP. In taking
critical stand than previous historians regarding the NWP, I explain why the policy of
"holding the party in power" was ineffective in both the 1914 and 1916 elections. A
close examination of Wilson's correspondence reveals that his most-trusted advisors told
him not to worry about women in the West becoming single-issue voters and abandoning
the Democrats. The election results indicate that Wilson's advisors were right.
Furthermore, the militant tactics employed by the NWP beginning in 1917 hurt the
cause of suffrage much more than they furthered it. By appearing to be disloyal during
wartime, the militant pickets damaged the image of the suffrage movement just as the
President was beginning to become more supportive of the cause. The argument made by
the NWP leaders was that the tremendous publicity they were generating would force the
President to act. However, the overwhelming majority of the correspondence from NWP
members all over the country back to the NWP headquarters indicates that publicity, if it
existed at all, was mostly negative in local papers. A tiny minority of Americans
protested about the violation of the pickets' civil rights. A vast majority, many ofwhom
were ardent suffrage supporters, believed that attacking a president who was trying to
conduct a war was reprehensible.
8
cause
The NAWSA strategy, on the other hand, made the President an ally to the
Their decision to remain nonpartisan and to support the war strengthened Wilson's hand
as he prevailed upon members of Congress and the general public to reward women's
war service and aid his goal of "making the world safe for democracy" by granting full
democratic rights in the United States. NAWSA' s disavowal of the NWP and active
campaign to distinguish themselves from their more militant and partisan sisters
succeeded in bringing the President and his cabinet more closely in line with the
NAWSA leadership. Politically, their decision to distance themselves from the NWP
paid big dividends with the President, members of Congress, and the general public.
Finally, this thesis investigates the manner in which the federal suffrage amendment
created enemies among Southern Democrats, the liquor industry, and the textile industry.
These enemies, just like NAWSA and the NWP, had an impact on the President. While
publicly willing to support the suffrage amendment, Wilson was privately only willing to
push certain members of Congress. He was least willing to push those whose support he
had relied on in the past and whom he knew faced constituents panicked about threats to
white supremacy and campaign contributors fearful ofwoman suffrage crippling their
ability to employ child labor in cotton textile mills. To see suffrage as one of many
competing priorities on Wilson's agenda is to see it in a new light. Using Wilson's
experience with the suffrage campaign to examine the two-way street of executive
influence is to shed light on the darker corners of both the past and our present. 11
11
Using Wilson's experience with the issue ofwoman suffrage to examine executive
influence raises two additional questions that I intend to explore in a later, expanded
study. First, once Wilson was converted to the suffrage cause, how did his advocacy of
the federal amendment to Congress compare to his advocacy of other issues he
championed? Was he more or less willing to engage in "executive interference" for
q
In order to contextualize the final phase of the suffrage campaign during Wilson's
second term, I spend the next chapter reviewing key events leading up to the 1916
presidential election. This review includes an examination of the evolution of Wilson's
stance on women in politics from a position of pure political opposition and personal
disgust to supporting the right of each state to choose for themselves whether or not
women would have the right to vote. Additionally, this chapter sketches the late- 19th
century roots of the woman suffrage campaign to include the 1893 NAWSA decision to
focus on state referenda rather than a federal amendment. Included in this section is a
discussion of the racism of white suffragists and the manner in which they, more often
than not, sacrificed the principle of universal suffrage for the expedient attainment of
white woman suffrage. Recounting the gradual growth in the number of suffrage states,
the quagmire of the Shafroth-Palmer Amendment, and the split between NAWSA and the
NWP, Chapter Two concludes with a summary of the suffrage situation as the nation
moved into the 1916 election year.
Wilson's conversion from a states' rights supporter to an advocate of the federal
amendment occurred between the Democratic National Convention in June 1916 and his
address to Congress in December 1917. The significant events that took place in between
serve as the basis of the analysis in Chapters Three and Four. From January 1918 until
final passage in the Senate in June 1919, Wilson actively campaigned for the federal
prohibition, child labor laws, and/or the League of Nations? Secondly, what was the
basis of Wilson's understanding of the rules that governed his interaction with Congress?
Is he following a historical precedent or is he abiding by self-imposed restrictions? How
do Wilson's actions compare with those of other Chief Executives? Did the relationship
rti
between the President and the Senate change as a result of the 17 Amendment that
provided for the direction election of Senators? This thesis does not seek to answer these
questions, but it does provide the initial framework for a study that will address them.
10
amendment. Chapter Five examines his specific actions and the reaction of those he tried
to influence. Additionally, this chapter incorporates the influence that anti-suffrage
interests had on both the President and Congress. The ratification process lasted from
June 1919 to August 1920. It became, in many ways, a race between the two political
parties to see which one could claim they had helped the cause the most, thereby winning
the votes ofwomen in the 1920 Presidential and Congressional elections. Although
Wilson was actively involved in trying to speed ratification, his was but one voice among
many as suffragists battled local interests and prejudices in each individual state. In that
this study is principally concerned with Wilson's ability to influence the Congress, the
ratification process is only briefly examined.
The concluding chapter reiterates the arguments made here - that Wilson did have a
significant role to play in the successful passage of the 19th Amendment, but that more
powerful currents like sectionalism, race, and economic interests sometimes limited the
extent of his influence. Additionally, the strategy employed by NAWSA was the most
effective in winning the loyalty of the President and, thereby, facilitating victory in the
suffrage campaign.
11
CHAPTER 2
PRELUDE TO WILSON'S SECOND TERM
on
Wilson's Evolutionary Suffrage Stance
Near the end of a long session of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee
Woman Suffrage in December 1915, Carrie Chapman Cart testified to the committee, "I
have discovered that when a man believes in woman suffrage it is a national question and
when he does not believe in it he says it is a question for the states." 12 At the time of
Cart's testimony, President Woodrow Wilson represented the non-believers. He
supported woman suffrage only as an issue to be decided by the voters of each state. On
the same day that Cart testified to the House Committee, President Wilson gave an
interview to the New York Times in which he restated his position on the issue. Pointing
to the fact that he voted in favor of the state amendment in his home state in New Jersey
in October of that year, Wilson said that he believed suffrage was an issue to be decided
by the voters of each state. He conceded, however, that he would take the idea of a
federal amendment into consideration. 13 This concession was a huge step forward for a
man who had been adamantly opposed to women's political involvement only a few
years before.
As early as 1885, Wilson wrote to his soon-to-be wife, Ellen Axson, that he did not
approve of any of the notions floating around society that women should be liberated
from the bonds of family to lead independent lives or become involved in the public
12 HWS, 469.
13 New York Times, 16 Dec 1917.
12
sphere. Wilson believed that family was the bedrock of society and that increased rights
for women would alter the precious balance within families. Ellen totally supported his
ideas about women's place in the home and in society. 14 Later that same year, Wilson
began his first teaching assignment at Bryn Mawr College, a recently founded women's
college in Pennsylvania. The college president, M. Carey Thomas, was an ardent
supporter of women's rights and increased educational opportunities for women. Ellen
was troubled that Wilson had to answer to a woman, and Wilson confided to a friend that
Thomas represented to him that which he most detested - "advanced women." 15
Wilson's years at Bryn Mawr were difficult for him and for those with whom he
worked precisely because of his view that higher education was wasted on the minds of
young women. As the head of the History Department, Wilson taught courses on Ancient
Greece and Rome as well as on European History and American politics. He also gave
informal talks on current affairs and constitutional development. He was extremely
14
Levin, 26. and Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson: Life and Letters, 8 vols.,
vol. 8 (New York: Doubleday, Doran, and Company, 1939), 240-241. Hereafter referred
to as Life and Letters. See also Arthur S. Link, Wilson: The Road to the White House
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1947), 2. Wilson's second wife,
Edith Boiling Gait, also held very traditional views of women's inferior intellectual and
political status. Within Wilson's familial circle, the only woman who held a more
progressive view was his eldest daughter, Margaret. Margaret served as the chair of
NAWSA's Honorary Committee during preparations for the 1915 National Convention
and was given a seat of honor on the platform at the convention's final session.
Additionally, she was a guest of honor at the February 1917 NAWSA Conference at
which the organization took an affirmative stand on the President's war position. See
HWS, Vol. 5, 440, 459, and 724. There is no evidence that Margaret's participation in the
suffrage movement caused a rift between her and her father. On the contrary, Wilson
remained close to all three of his daughters throughout their lives. See Heckscher and the
memoirs of Wilson's youngest daughter, Eleanor Wilson McAdoo, The Woodrow
Wilsons (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1937).
15
For a detailed account of Wilson's experience at Bryn Mawr and conflicts with M.
Carey Thomas, see Heckscher, 80-94 and Levin, 140.
popular among the undergraduate students who attended his lectures, but the feelings
were not mutual. 16 Wilson confided his feelings about the students to his diary, writing
"Lecturing to young women of the present generation on the history and principles of
politics is about as appropriate and profitable as would be lecturing to stone masons on
the evolution of fashion in dress." 17
Wilson was assigned a graduate fellow for each of his three years on the Bryn Mawr
faculty. Writing to a Wilson biographer in 1926, one of his graduate students recalled
that Wilson was ill-suited for teaching women because he assumed that their minds were
somehow different than men's. She thought it was unfortunate for both Wilson and his
students that he never made an effort to find out whether his assumptions were true. 18
Regardless, Wilson abruptly left Bryn Mawr in 1888 after a contract dispute with the
college. He accepted a position at Wesleyan University in Connecticut, confiding to a
friend, "I have long been hungry for a class of men." 19
His views on the inappropriateness of women's interest in politics changed little over
the next two decades. According to Frank Stockbridge, the director of publicity for
Wilson's 1912 presidential campaign, the future president was horrified by the idea of
16
For an excellent summary of Wilson's years at Bryn Mawr, see Henry Wilkinson
Bragdon, Woodrow Wilson: The Academic Years (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press, 1967), 143-161.
17 Woodrow Wilson, Diary Entry (October 20, 1887), Woodrow Wilson Papers,
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. (Hereafter referred to as
PWW)
Bragdon, 152. The graduate student who provided this account was Lucy
Maynard Salmon who, after leaving Bryn Mawr, taught history at Vassar College for
nearly forty years.
19
Ibid., 162.
14
women voters. The suffrage question was repeatedly posed to Wilson as he traveled the
campaign trail in the western states in 1 9 1 1 . As Stockbridge reported in a 1 924
reminiscence, Wilson "was definitely and irreconcilably opposed to woman suffrage;
woman's place was in the home, and the type ofwoman who took an active part in the
suffrage agitation was totally abhorrent to him."20 Stockbridge went on to explain that
Wilson decided to adopt a states' rights stance during the campaign in order to effectively
"dodge the issue."
Wilson's victory in 1912 was dominant in terms of the electoral vote. He won 435
electoral votes as compared with 88 votes for the Bull Moose Progressive candidate,
Theodore Roosevelt, and eight votes for the incumbent Republican William Taft. The
ascension of a Democratic president was accompanied by the election of a Democratic
House and Senate. The popular vote, however, revealed that Wilson did not have the
mandate that the electoral vote indicated. Wilson received just over six million votes
while Roosevelt garnered more than four million, Taft secured nearly three and half
million, and the Socialist candidate, Eugene V. Debs, captured another 900,000. All
together, the other candidates received three million more popular votes than Wilson.
The president-elect recognized that the Democrats were not the dominant party in the
nation and that they were only guaranteed a two-year hold on the House of
Representatives. His first term, then, had to be focused on those issues he considered key
• • • • 21
provisions of his "New Freedom" campaign platform - tariff and currency reform.
20
Frank Parker Stockbridge, "How Woodrow Wilson Won His Nomination,'
Current History 20 (1924): 567.
21
Link, Wilson: The Road to the White House, 524-525
IS
Background of Woman Suffrage Movement
Cart's speech to the House Suffrage Committee in December 1915 was one of her
first actions as the newly elected president ofNAWSA. She succeeded Dr. Anna Howard
Shaw who had been the president since 1905. The previous two decades had been
extremely difficult for the suffrage movement. Under the guidance of Susan B. Anthony
during the early 1890s, NAWSA had focused its efforts on securing a constitutional
amendment that would grant suffrage at the national level. In 1 893, however, the
organization decided instead to seek amendments of state constitutions. In effect, the
movement for a federal amendment was abandoned. 22
One of the chief reasons for this shift in focus was the issue of race in Southern
states. Between 1890 and 1910, all twelve southern states succeeded in disfranchising
black male voters who had been granted suffrage through the 15 th Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution at the end of the Civil War. They completed this task through an elaborate
set of literacy and property qualifications and use of a poll tax. When those tools also
resulted in the exclusion of many poor, white voters, Southern politicians created flimsy
loopholes about "good character" and "understanding" that allowed whites to vote, but
still excluded blacks. White supremacy was guaranteed in the South so long as the states
were allowed to establish electoral qualifications and conduct elections.23
A federal woman suffrage amendment threatened this system because it granted
Congress power to enforce the provisions of the amendment. To white Southerners, the
22
Flexner and Fitzpatrick, 2 1 2-2 1
3
23 Morgan, 74-75
16
enforcement clause of the amendment evoked negative memories of Reconstruction when
federal troops were stationed in the South in order to enforce the voting rights of black
men. The fact that black women could just as handily be disfranchised as black men did
little to assuage their fears. The specter of federal intervention into voting practices in the
South made discussion of a federal amendment impossible for Southern politicians.24
Using "states' rights" as a thinly veiled disguise for preserving white supremacy, they
eschewed any association with suffrage sympathies. The only hope, or so it seemed to
NAWSA at the dawn of the twentieth century, was to work for state referenda.
It is important to take a moment here to review the records of both NAWSA and the
NWP on the issue of black voting rights. Sadly, the record is less than complimentary for
either organization. As numerous historians have pointed out, time and time again white
suffragists from both national organizations abandoned their black counterparts if a
coalition of the two groups threatened the chances for white women gaining the right to
25
vote. Often, suffrage leaders found themselves in the awkward position of promising
Ibid., 76., and Elna C. Green, Southern Strategies: Southern Women and the
Woman Suffrage Question (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 11.
25 •
For general descriptions of the relationships between white and black women in
the suffrage movement see Flexner and Aileen S. Kraditor, The Ideas ofthe Woman
Suffrage Movement (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965). For a more focused
examination, see Rosalyn Terborg-Penn, African American Women in the Strugglefor the
Vote, 1850-1920 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998). or Green. An
illuminating theoretical examination of race and feminism can be found in Louise
Michele Newman, White Women's Rights: The Racial Origins ofFeminism in the United
States (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999). Newman points to the manner in
which imperialism, white women's participation in reform movements, and the
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American women, see Glenda E. Gilmore, Gender and Jim Crow: Women and the
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Southern white men that enfranchising women would not threaten white political
supremacy because black women could be barred from the polls in the same manner that
black men had been disfranchised.
On the extreme were women like Kate Gordon of Louisiana who was as much of a
white supremacist as any of her male counterparts. Gordon, an ardent states' rights
suffragist, broke with NAWSA when Catt began to focus the organization on the federal
amendment. During the ratification campaign, she went so far as to join forces with the
anti-suffragists and work to prevent ratification in Louisiana and Mississippi.26
Fortunately, few southern suffragists followed Gordon into the ranks of the "anti's."
Still, even those that remained within NAWSA and the NWP took an accomodationist
position on the issue of black voting rights in the South. The growing emphasis on
expediency in the final stages of the suffrage movement had many casualties. Foremost
among them were disfranchised black voters - male and female alike.
With NAWSA' s new focus on state campaigns, women had been granted full
suffrage in four western states by 1896. However, between 1896 and 1910, no new
suffrage states were won and only six state referenda were held. Between 1910 and
Politics of White Supremacy in North Carolina, 1896-1920 (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1996).
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1913, six more states granted women full suffrage, but the cumulative electoral votes of
all nine suffrage states only totaled 74 out of a possible 531. As a result of this slow rate
of progress a rift had developed within NAWSA over the appropriate strategy to secure
woman suffrage. In 1912, two young women, recently returned from working with the
militant suffragists in England, asked Dr. Shaw to appoint them to NAWSA'
s
Congressional Committee. Alice Paul and Lucy Burns hoped to revive the defunct
committee whose purpose it was to press for a federal amendment. Rather than fighting
the suffrage battle state-by-state, Paul and Burns hoped to win one sweeping victory at
the national level.
Alice Paul was born into a Quaker family in Moorestown, New Jersey in 1 885. She
graduated from Swarthmore College in 1905, received an MA at the University of
Pennsylvania two years later, and a Ph.D. from the same in 1912. Between her MA and
Ph.D. work in America, Paul spent more than two years in England as a graduate student
in sociology and economics at the University of London. During her time in England,
she became involved with the Women's Social and Political Union (WSPU) of London
and also met Lucy Burns, another American studying abroad. 27
Burns, the fourth of eight children born into an Irish-Catholic family in Brooklyn,
was a 1902 graduate of Vassar College. She briefly worked as a high school teacher
before beginning graduate work at Yale. In 1906, she moved to Germany to intensively
study foreign languages at the University of Berlin and, later, at the University of Bonn.
After three years in Germany, Burns transferred to Oxford University in England for
27
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additional graduate work and became involved in the English militant suffra
movement.28
Both women participated in British suffrage activity, were arrested for their actions,
and served time in British jails. They became familiar with militant tactics such as
showing up to protest and heckle members of Parliament at different speaking
engagements, organizing suffrage parades, and participating in hunger strikes while in
jail. They also became familiar with the political strategy employed by the WSPU of
"holding the party in power responsible" for passing suffrage legislation.29
Under the British parliamentary system, one party could be held responsible and
ousted from power for failure to pass specific legislation. Although the American system
of government differed, Paul and Burns were convinced that since the Democrats held the
presidency and a majority in Congress, that party should push through a federal suffrage
amendment. If they failed to do so, they should have to face the consequences of being
campaigned against by the suffragists in states where women had secured the right to
vote.
Paul was appointed chair ofNAWSA's Congressional Committee when she was just
27 years old. She brought her experience from England, youthful energy, tremendous
organizational skills, and persuasive powers to the task of securing a federal amendment.
She also brought the immense talents, experience, and energy of Lucy Burns who was
appointed as her vice-chair.3 These two women immediately infused the campaign with
28
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a sense of purpose and direction never seen before. Their first major accomplishment
was planning, organizing, and executing a suffrage parade in Washington, D.C. on the
day before Wilson's inauguration in March 1913.
Nearly 8,000 women from all over the country participated in the parade that moved
from the Capitol, up Pennsylvania Avenue, and ended at the Hall of the Daughters of the
American Revolution. Towards the end of the parade route, rowdy members of the
crowd began to press forward and some physically attacked the marchers. Marchers had
their suffrage banners ripped from their hands. Several were knocked to the ground and
trampled by the crowd. The police failed to intervene in a timely manner and a
detachment of soldiers from nearby Fort Meyers had to be dispatched to settle the
disturbance. Two days after the parade, the Senate passed two resolutions demanding an
investigation into the police department's failure to safeguard the marchers. 31 Paul's
suffrage parade, coupled with the intense lobbying of members of Congress that she
initiated, abruptly awakened members of Congress to NAWSA's desire for a federal
amendment.
During Paul's tenure with NAWSA's Congressional Committee, the
Congressional Union, and the NWP, Burns served as her second-in-command. The
manner in which they divided up leadership responsibilities is an area in need of further
research, but both the secondary scholarship and the existing NWP records suggests that
Paul was the political visionary and Burns served as a workhorse ensuring Paul's visions
were carried out. This is not to say that Burns lacked vision or that Paul spent all her
time making plans without becoming involved in their execution. There seems to have
been an enormous amount of overlap in their duties. Burns often answered mail
addressed to Paul if the latter was incommunicado for one reason or another. For the
most thorough description of their working relationship, see Irwin, 14-18.
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Shortly after her appointment as chair of the Congressional Committee, Paul formed
a parallel organization called the Congressional Union (CU) to support the activities of
the Committee. Accepted only as an auxiliary to NAWSA but under the direction of a
NAWSA officer (Paul), the CU took actions that seemingly violated fundamental tenets
of the National's policy. These actions led to sharp dissension within NAWSA and
eventually to a split among the organization's members. As Catt explained in an article
written three years after the split, "A break with the National occurred because [Paul and
the CU] refused to accede to certain established rules of the Association."32 She went on
to list the infractions which included using NAWSA funds for CU activities, conducting
work in individual states without coordinating with NAWSA state officers, and
campaigning against Democratic candidates in western states. The conflict came to a
head at the 1913 NAWSA convention where the charges were debated at length.
Following the convention, NAWSA' s executive council demanded that Paul eliminate
any conflicts of interest by resigning her position as head of the Congressional Union.
When she refused, they requested her resignation as chair of the Congressional
Committee, which she provided.
Historians and historical actors alike disagree over some of the underlying causes of
the rift. Alice Paul biographer Christine Lunardini argues that the NAWSA leadership
generally accepted Paul's melding of Congressional Committee and Congressional Union
33
funds. Catt, on the other hand, lists the funding issue as one of the central points of
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contention. Paul denied most of the charges Catt levied in her 1916 "The Winning
Policy" article. In an extensive set of correspondence through intermediaries, Catt and
Paul argued over minute details such as what type of stationary the CU used to raise
funds and whether or not CU officials cooperated or worked independently with NAWSA
officials in various states during 1913. 34 This correspondence suggests that financial and
administrative concerns may have been a cover for deeper philosophical and generational
issues. While Catt's 1916 article makes it clear that Paul's "holding the party in power
responsible" seemed politically unsound, an interesting letter from Harriet Stanton Blatch
suggests the generational issue.
Blatch was the daughter of the famous nineteenth century women's rights activist
Elizabeth Cady Stanton and, in 1913, head of the New York state-based Women's
Political Union. Also a veteran of the British suffrage campaign, she had assisted Paul
and Burns with their preparation for the 1913 suffrage parade in Washington, D.C. and
generally supported their enthusiastic work for the federal amendment. After the
tumultuous 1913 NAWSA convention, Blatch wrote to Burns, "I was distressed, but not
amazed, to read the news in regard to the action of the National Association, in reference
to Miss Paul's chairmanship ... I say I was not surprised because again and again I have
seen vigorous young women come forward, only to be rapped on the head by the so-
called leaders of our movement." * Clearly, the rift between NAWSA and the CU was at
7 7
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least in part a turf war between suffrage veterans and younger women with less patience
for the long haul of state campaigns.
In the first few months of 1914, representatives of the Congressional Union met with
NAWSA leaders in an attempt to keep the groups from developing into rival
organizations, but disagreements over strategy prevented any such rapprochement. The
Congressional Union, in flagrant violation ofNAWSA's non-partisan policy, campaigned
against the Democratic candidates in the western states during the midterm elections of
1914 and announced their plans to campaign against Wilson and the national Democratic
slate in the elections of 1916. After one final failed attempt at reconciliation in December
1915, the two organizations severed all ties. 36
The Quagmire of the Shafroth-Palmer Amendment
Paul's replacement as head ofNAWSA's Congressional Committee, Ruth Hanna
McCormick, further muddled the already cloudy suffrage picture by bringing about the
introduction of an additional suffrage-related amendment to the Constitution in March
1914. An experienced suffragist from Illinois, McCormick discerned that gaining
suffrage by the state initiative method was much more palatable to the majority of
Congressmen than a federal amendment. Working with Senator William Shafroth of
Colorado and Representative A. Mitchell Palmer of Pennsylvania, McCormick and her
Lunardini, 49. See also Becker, 4., and Jacqueline Van Voris, Carrie Chapman
Catt: A Public Life (New York: The Feminist Press and the City University ofNew York,
1987), 119-120/
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committee tried to meet the tastes of the majority of Congressmen by developing a new
suffrage constitutional amendment.37
The Shafroth-Palmer Amendment required that if eight percent of voters in any state
signed an initiative petition requesting a referendum on woman suffrage, the state then
must submit the question of suffrage to the voters. This new variation offered relief from
two major problems facing suffragists. First, it held the potential to force a vote in states
that had so far managed to defeat campaigns for state referenda. Secondly, it could gain
the support of Senators who opposed suffrage on the principle of states' rights because it
contained no provisions for federal enforcement and the voters of each individual state
would still make the decision on suffrage. 38
Opponents of the new amendment believed the measure was difficult to understand
and only prolonged an already difficult process. Even if the bill passed both houses of
Congress and was ratified by three-fourths of the states, a battle to win state referenda
would still have to be fought in each non-suffrage state. Shaw was flooded with angry
letters from NAWSA members all over the country after the new amendment was
introduced. She responded with a blanket letter to all NAWSA members that indicated
just how directionless NAWSA was in the final years of her presidency. She wrote, "The
National Association is not abandoning the old Constitutional amendment. It worked for
it all this winter until it was voted down by a majority, which showed there was no hope
Carrie Chapman Catt and Nettie Rogers Shuler, Woman Suffrage and Politics: The
Inner Story ofthe Suffrage Movement (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1923), 246-
247.
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was
whatever of passing it
.
. .
While we are pushing the new amendment we are also pushing
the old amendment, and it is hoped that the new one will help the old one and it was
introduced for that purpose."39 She went on to blame the Congressional Union for any
confusion over the matter, claiming that the CU was trying to gain support for their
organization by giving "the impression that we have forsaken the old amendment, which
is absolutely false."40
For the remainder of that year and well into the next, NAWSA simultaneously
supported the traditional federal amendment and the Shafroth-Palmer amendment. It
not until the December 1915 NAWSA convention that the latter was officially
disavowed, although little work had been done on its behalf for the last half of that year.
The confusion within the National's ranks only fueled the fire of the CU as they headed
west to campaign against Democrats in the 1914 mid-term elections. As Burns explained
to Blatch, "It seems to me foolish to propose that we should undertake the tremendous
labor of getting the Constitution of the United States amended and, at the end of that
work, have gained nothing except the right to submit the question to the electors, which,
by a little intelligent and concentrated labor, we can do already. The procedure combines
all the difficulties of state and national work in one."41
The CU and the 1914 Mid-Term Elections
The CU campaigned against all Democrats, suffrage supporters or not, in Western
states during 1914. They urged enfranchised women to withdraw their support from the
39 Shaw to Ellen Douglas Hoge (April 11,1914), NWPP, Reel 1
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Democratic Party until it complied with their demands to enfranchise all women through
support of a federal amendment. Key to their campaign was the belief that women would
behave as single-issue voters. As the election results showed, however, this was a faulty
assumption. Democrats maintained control of both the House and the Senate, although
their majorities were significantly reduced. Despite CU claims to the contrary, this
reduction was not related to suffrage agitation. Most election analysts agreed that the
chief cause of Democratic setbacks was the decline of the Progressive Party and the
return ofmany former members to the Republican Party. Setbacks notwithstanding,
White House spokesmen released statements claiming victory for the Democratic Party
because they had increased their strength in the Midwest and Pacific Coast in a year
during which they had enacted unpopular tariff reform.42 In fact, the most significant
contribution made by the CU agitation may have been to contribute to the defeat of
several key state suffrage campaigns in 1914.
Seven states voted on woman suffrage in 1914, but only the Montana and Nevada
campaigns were successful. At the same time and in the same places that NAWSA State
Associations urged voters from all parties to support the suffrage referendum, CU
members actively worked against all Democrats and labeled that party an enemy to
suffrage. NAWSA members openly blamed the CU for their defeat in North Dakota and
Nebraska. 43 The president of the Ohio State Woman Suffrage Association, who generally
supported the work of the CU, wrote to Paul three times during the first week of October
42
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to indicate foe amounl of damage hen, done ,n her state by CU activity in the West, she
provided Paul with direct quotes from the Mayor and Postmaster of Cleveland who had
withdrawn their support lor suffrage in Ohio beeause of the CI ) and warned, »] honestly
and truly think that your campaign againsl the Democratic party in the enfranchised states
is hurting the ( )hio campaign."
'
1
( >hio was one of the live state referenda to fail during
1914.
An impartial observer of the woman suffrage movement from I9I4-I9IS would find
the situation greatly confusing. Two different groups that seemed to be working in exact
opposite directions represented the movement. The larger of the two groups, NAWSA,
was simultaneously supporting the traditional federal suffrage amendment and the
cumbersome Shafroth-I'almer bill, while still trying to win victories in a number of state
referenda campaigns. Meanwhile, the CI I was urging the abandonment of stale
campaigns, pouring all their energies into the traditional federal amendment, and
campaigning against all western Democrats (even those who supported suffrage) in order
to "hold the party in power responsible" for pushing the amendment through Congress.
During the congressional hearings on suffrage in December 1915, representatives of both
organizations insisted on providing separate testimony to the committees. Political
leaders from both parties could, and did, play the groups off one another and used the
confusion of the movement as an excuse to not take a definitive stand on the issue. This
was clearly the case with the President.
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As previously mentioned, Wilson's two major goals during his first term were
reducing tariffs and reforming the banking system. The legislative sessions of 1913 were
devoted to these causes and, using all the tools of persuasion available to his office,
Wilson was able to pull together the support of Western and Southern Democrats to pass
both measures.45 Woman suffrage was an issue that he had mainly been able to avoid
during 1913 by claiming that his administration was too busy with New Freedom
legislation to give the matter serious consideration. Through the aggressive efforts of
NAWSA's Congressional Committee under Paul's leadership, the amendment had been
reported out of the committee in the Senate in 1913 for the first time since 1896. It was
reported with a favorable majority again in 1914 and was headed to a vote in the full
Senate when the Democrats caucused in February. The Senate Democrats published their
position that suffrage was an issue to be decided by individual states - a position that
Wilson supported.46 When the vote came in the Senate on March 19, the amendment was
defeated by a count of 35 in favor and 34 opposed (1 1 votes short of the required two-
thirds).
Wilson could safely hide behind the party position on a federal amendment for most
of 1914, but events of the following year made it clear that his position would have to be
slightly amended if he hoped to win the support of Progressives in the 1916 election. As
the next chapter details, the fall and winter of 1915 were critical months for both Wilson
and the suffrage movement. The President found himself in need of Progressive support
heading into the 1916 election and the suffrage movement, still divided over the
Link, Wilson: The New Freedom, 186-197.
Morgan, 79-80.
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NAWSA/CU rift and the Shafroth-Palmer Amendment, faeed referenda campaigns in
four key states
- New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts. Between
October and December, the movement experienced a roller-coaster effect. Suffragists
lost all four of the state campaigns, but won more votes than many people expected in
several of the states. Furthermore, they secured crucial support when Wilson voted in
favor of the amendment as a private citizen of the state ofNew Jersey. Most importantly,
NAWSA's path took a decisive turn when it met in convention in December 1915,
dropped the Shafroth-Palmer Amendment, and elected Carrie Chapman Catt as the new
president.
30
CHAPTER 3
THE 1916 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
Wilson's Progressive Bow: The New Jersey Suffrage AmenrWnt
Heading into the election year of 1916, Wilson recognized the need to make a bow
toward progressive voters whom he had offended during the previous two years. His
opposition to rural credits, refusal to grant the American Federation of Labor immunity
from the Sherman Act, approval of racial segregation in federal service, and refusal to
support the Palmer Child Labor bill had alienated Progressives of every stripe and from
every section of the country. 47 This chapter argues that Wilson's need to win back some
of those voters played a major role in his decision to vote in favor of the suffrage
referendum in his home state ofNew Jersey.
The vote in New Jersey became a battleground for pro and anti-suffragists as each
side hoped to use the President's decision to their advantage in the public relations war.
The White House was flooded with letters from both sides of the debate imploring him to
support the cause in their favor. A letter from Caroline Cruvey just a few weeks before
the vote typifies the more than 100 letters Wilson received from anti-suffragists in New
Jersey alone, not to mention the correspondence from interested parties throughout the
country. Cruvey wrote:
As one of the majority, (as I believe), ofwomen opposed to Female Suffrage, I beg
you will not cast your vote with its great influence, on the affirmative side of "votes
47
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theIT , ' n° adGqUate gain C°ming from the admission of women intopolitical arena compensating for the added expense which will follow, and for the
SlSfT ? h°me,^ femily Ufe Whkh WU1^ result • • • There are norights to be advanced by our votes, for the laws are in our favor as regards ourpersons and property. The emotional nature of our sex sadly unfits us for
participation in politics and its hot-bed of passions. Won't you, by your vote leave
us a little longer in the quiet of our homes where most of us love to be, with time to
iZrest?4
'
8
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Despite this compelling appeal and hundreds like it, Wilson announced his decision to
vote in favor of the amendment on October 6, 1915.
In a statement issued to the press, he explained the rationale behind his decision
demonstrating the tentative nature of his support for women's voting rights. He insisted
that he was voting as a private citizen ofNew Jersey and not as the leader of the
Democratic Party. Furthermore, he reiterated his stance on the issue of a federal
amendment saying, "I believe that [suffrage] should be settled by the States and not by
the National Government and that in no circumstances should it be made a party
question, and my view has grown stronger at every turn of the agitation."49
The motivation behind Wilson's affirmative vote in New Jersey has been an issue of
great debate among historians. Link contends that events in Wilson's personal life
contributed to his decision. When Wilson's first wife died in August 1914, he was nearly
overcome with grief. Seven months later, however, he met Edith Boiling Gait who was
to become his second wife. Link asserts that women voters in the Western states were
upset about Wilson's quick courtship with Gait so soon after his wife's death and that
48
Caroline A. Cruvey to Woodrow Wilson (October 5, 1915), PWW, Box 89, Reel
208.
49 New York Times, October 7, 1915.
32
Wilson's affirmative vote in New Jersey was an attempt to pacify those indignant women
voters who would play a significant role in the 1916 election. 50
Link's analysis ofthe significance of Wilson's impending marriage on his decision
to vote for suffrage in New Jersey is overstated. The memoirs of Wilson's Secretary of
the Navy, Josephus Daniels, reveal that many senior Democratic leaders were indeed
worried about offending women voters in the West if the President married Gait before
the 1916 election. Daniels was asked by a number of Democrats to approach the
President and warn him of the political liabilities of a hasty remarriage. 1 lis negative
response to the request is worth quoting in full:
Having been called [to the post of Secretary of the Navyj by President Wilson I did
not feel inclined to exchange it for the difficult and, perhaps, dangerous high and
exalted position of Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary to the Court of
Cupid on a mission in which neither my heart nor my head was enlisted and in the
performance of which my official head might suffer decapitation
. . . Wilson was not
warned. They were married before Christmas and two things followed: (1) Wilson
was reelected, proving that political prognosticators are not always right; and (2)
they lived happily together and Mrs. Wilson's charm and sound wisdom'made her
greatly beloved and admired. 51
While many may take issue with Daniels' characterization of Gait as charming and wise,
his account of this episode erodes support for Link's theory that Wilson's advisors were
willing to broach the topic of the political ramifications of remarriage with their boss.
Daniels' contention that women voters were not put off by the president's remarriage is
well supported by both the election results (Wilson swept the West in 1916) and Gait's
memoirs of the same time period.
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Gait recalled tremendous support from people all over the country after Wilson
announced their marriage plans. The couple immediately began to receive congratulatory
telegrams from friends and strangers. They received a standing ovation when they were
announced to the crowd at a Red Sox-Phillies game the day after their engagement
announcement and another ovation the following month when they attended the annual
Army-Navy football game. Gait further recalled, "Among the gifts which came at the
time our engagement was announced was a large nugget of gold from the people of
California with the request that part of it be used for our wedding ring. It was such a
charming letter that we decided to accept the gift and the suggestion."52 Women in
California had been granted full suffrage in 1 9 1 1 . The combination of the accounts of
Daniels and Gait about the reaction of Americans to Wilson's hasty courtship and
remarriage indicate that the President's decision to vote for suffrage in New Jersey was
not likely connected to fear of offending women voters in the Western states.
Christine Lunardini and Thomas J. Knock argue that Wilson had to vote for the New
Jersey amendment in order to not appear hypocritical. Regardless of his personal
feelings, he had supported suffrage as a state issue in his 1912 campaign. To abstain
from voting in New Jersey would appear hypocritical and to vote no would have offended
progressive elements within the Democratic Party. This argument has merit, but their
further explanation that Wilson had "simply been overwhelmed by growing suffrage
demands" is unconvincing given the chaos within the suffrage movement, the clear
repudiation of the Federal Amendment by the Senate in 1914 and the House in 1915, and
Edith Boiling Wilson, My Memoir (New York: The Bobbs-Merill Company.
1938), 81-83.
34
the fact that New Jersey voters opposed the state referendum by a margin of nearly three
to two.
53
Voting in favor of the New Jersey referendum was the most politically sawy move
for Wilson. It was a move that would please suffragists in the East and women voters in
the West, as well as progressive elements of the electorate from across the country that
had been alienated by some of Wilson's actions in 1914 and 1915. Supporting suffrage
in New Jersey would not alienate Southern Democrats because it in no way committed
Wilson to support the dreaded federal amendment. In fact, as his statement to the press
reveals, he went out of his way to make it clear that his vote in New Jersey only
reaffirmed his support of a states' rights approach to politics.
The New Jersey referendum was defeated by a margin of 51,200 out of a total of
3 1 7,600 votes cast - a margin of almost 3 to 2. 54 Nonetheless, Catt was elated upon
hearing the announcement that the President would vote in favor of suffrage. From her
post as the Chair of the Empire State Suffrage Campaign in New York, Catt immediately
sent a telegram to the White House on the day of his announcement saying, "On behalf of
a million women in New York State who have declared they want the ballot, please
accept my gratitude for your announcement that you will vote for the woman suffrage
amendment in New Jersey."55 Catt hoped that the President's actions in New Jersey
Christine A. Lunardini and Thomas J. Knock, "Woodrow Wilson and Woman
Suffrage: A New Look," Political Science Quarterly 95, no. 4 (1980-1981): 660-661.
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would positively influence voters in New York - a hope that was not fulfilled in the 1915
suffrage campaign in the Empire State.
Wilson's vote did not push suffrage to victory in Pennsylvania or Massachusetts,
either. Still, it was symbolically important for the movement. NAWSA never failed
from that day forward to point out that the President supported suffrage, at least in
principle, because of his affirmative vote in New Jersey. The results in Pennsylvania
were somewhat encouraging to suffragists. With the exception of Philadelphia, suffrage
had won a majority in all the large industrial areas. The margin of defeat was only seven
percent, with 80% of the opposition votes coming from Philadelphia. Both New Jersey
and Pennsylvania had state constitutions that mandated a five-year waiting period for
resubmission of defeated amendments, so near-term hopes were diminished despite the
close election returns.
56
Massachusetts, home of the National Association Opposed to Woman Suffrage, only
gained 35.5 percent of the total vote in favor of the amendment. New York, though,
showed the most promise for a future near-term victory. Despite losing by nearly
200,000 votes, voters in many industrial areas had begun to support suffrage, and the
state's suffrage leaders were confident that they could win the next time around. New
York required a two-year wait between amendment votes, but suffrage leaders announced
the start of their 1917 campaign on the night of their 1915 defeat. 57
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Turning Point for NAWSA: C»tt> s Ascension to P-^,w
Catt's election as President ofNAWSA in December 1915 was actually the second
time that she had been elected to that post. It marked another milestone in her life, which
had largely been devoted to increasing women's rights since her initial engagement with
the suffrage movement in Iowa in 1885. Born in Ripon, Wisconsin in 1859, Catt moved
with her family to Charles City, Iowa in 1866. She was one of seven women to enter
Iowa State Agricultural College (now Iowa State University) in 1877. Following her
graduation in 1 880, she taught high school in Mason City for three years before being
promoted to the position of Superintendent of Schools in 1883. 58
Following her marriage to Leo Chapman in 1 885, Catt resigned her position as
school superintendent and served as her husband's co-editor of the Mason City
newspaper. Leo Chapman died from typhoid fever in 1 886 just a few months after the
couple had moved from Iowa to San Francisco. At the age of 27, Catt was widowed,
unemployed, and living alone in a new city. She took up free-lance journalism for a few
years before returning to Iowa in 1887 and beginning work as a public lecturer. Shortly
after her return to her home state, she rejoined the Iowa Woman Suffrage Association,
becoming a paid lecturer in 1889.
In a move that surprised many of her suffrage comrades, Carrie married George Catt
in 1 890. The couple had first met at Iowa State during their undergraduate years and
became reacquainted during Carrie's time in San Francisco. George Catt was an engineer
Biographical information about Catt's early years in Iowa and her initial
involvement in the suffrage movement is detailed in Robert Booth Fowler, Carrie Catt:
Feminist Politician (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1986), 3-4., as well as Van
Voris, 7-13. See also Mary G. Peck, Carrie Chapman Catt: A Biography (New York:
The H.W. Wilson Company, 1944).
^7
earn
who spent a great deal of his time at work sites in Washington state and California. To
the immense pleasure of the Iowa suffragists, Carrie's marriage did not end her work for
their movement. She and her new husband made an agreement that he would work and
money to support them and that she would continue with her reform work, even if
that meant they would have to spend a great deal of time apart from one another. 59
In the same year that she remarried, Catt first entered into the limelight ofNAWSA
by giving a speech at the National Convention. She impressed the leaders of the
National, including Susan B. Anthony, who later hand-picked her to lead the successful
1893 state suffrage campaign in Colorado, serve as Chair of the Organization Committee
from 1895-1899, and to succeed her as NAWSA's president in 1900. Catt served four
one-year terms. Her tenure was marked positively by the formation of the International
Woman Suffrage Alliance (IWSA), but negatively by repeated failure to secure any
victories in state suffrage campaigns. Frustrated by the lack of progress, increasingly
interested in her work with the IWSA, and concerned about George Cart's failing health,
Carrie Catt resigned the NAWSA presidency in 1904. 60
Following George's death in 1905, Catt immersed herself in work with IWSA. Her
longtime lieutenant from their early NAWSA days, Mary (Mollie) Garret Hay, came to
live with her and join in international suffrage work. For the remainder of Hay's life, she
and Catt lived and worked together. 61 From 1905-1913, the bulk of Catt' s energy was
For Catt's account of this agreement, see Van Voris, 20., and Fowler, 15.
60 Van Voris, 55-59.
61 Hay died 19 years before Catt, however, when Catt died in 1947 she left
instructions that she was to be buried next to her long-time partner. Shortly after Hay's
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devoted to work with IWSA. Following a major suffrage victory in Illinois in 1913,
however, she agreed to serve as chair of the Empire State Campaign Committee in New
York. As explained above, NAWSA leaders hoped to capitalize on the momentum of the
Illinois win by gaining victories in several Eastern states in 1915. For the next two years,
Catt worked tirelessly on the New York state suffrage campaign. Although unsuccessful
in winning the referendum, Catt's popularity and prestige within NAWSA soared as a
result of her leadership of the campaign. It was in the wake of the New York defeat that
she reluctantly agreed to serve again as NAWSA' s president. 62
Catt faced a daunting task as she accepted the reigns ofNAWSA in December 1915.
She knew that the organization needed a clear focus and direction that included educating
the public and key politicians alike about the differences between the National and the
CU. While still at her post as chair of the New York suffrage campaign she was sensitive
to the need for distance from the CU. She wrote to Jane Addams in January 1915
expressing her desire to steer clear of any organization that involved the CU because she
did not want her name or NAWSA linked with that group. Addams had requested that
she attend a conference in Washington, D.C. with several other women's groups to
discuss the formation of a peace organization. Initially, Catt agreed to attend - only later
discovering that the CU was hosting the conference. She immediately wrote to Addams,
reneging on her agreement to attend the conference.
death, Catt had a monument erected over their burial plot in New Rochelle, New York.
The monument reads, "Here lie two, united in friendship for thirty-eight years through
constant service to a great cause." See Van Voris, 219.
62
Fowler, 28.
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She explained in the letter that she held no personal animosity toward the CU, but its
leaders continued to pursue an anti-Democratic campaign when the suffrage amendment
was pending in eleven states and depended for success on Democratic votes. Catt told
Addams, "As Chairman of the New York Campaign Committee, I must not allow myself
to be placed where I seem to sanction that policy."63 Even as a state level representative
ofNAWSA, Catt recognized the potential damage her association with the CU could
have for the National. She carried that level of recognition with her into the NAWSA
front office.
The historical record indicates that her fears about public confusion were well
founded. Not even the President, a fairly astute and informed political player, was able to
match suffrage leaders' names with the organizations they represented. In July 1916,
Catt and Mrs. Frank M. Roessing, chair ofNAWSA' s Congressional Committee,
requested to meet with Wilson. The President's personal secretary, Joseph Tumulty,
communicated the request to him via a memorandum. In a hand-written note at the
bottom of the memo, Wilson asked, "Are these ladies of the 'Congressional Union'
variety?"64 Tumulty replied with a note explaining the difference between the two
groups, pointing out that Roessing and Catt represented the more "conservative"
organization that did not approve of the radical heckling methods of the CU. He also
Catt to Addams (January 4, 1915), Carrie Chapman Catt Papers, Manuscript
Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., Box 4, Reel 3. (Hereafter referred to as
CLOG). Addams eventually persuaded Catt to attend the conference by promising that
her presence would not compromise her position within the suffrage movement. See
William L. O'Neill, Everyone Was Brave: A History ofFeminism in America (New York:
The New York Times Book Company, 1971), 174-175.
64 Tumulty to Wilson (July 27, 1916), PWW, Box 89, Reel 209.
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informed the President that Catt was scheduled to address the Democratic State
Convention in West Virginia the following week, which helped to distinguish her from
the anti-Democratic practices of the rival organization. 65
After reading Tumulty's explanation, Wilson, satisfied that he was not meeting with
the enemy, wrote on the memorandum, "Okay Tuesday at 2 pm - office."66 It is
significant to note Wilson's confusion in mid-1916. Clearly he was aware of the CU's
agitation against his party and was reluctant to grant leaders of that organization an
audience. If his ability to distinguish between the two groups were not changed, he might
have continued to associate the federal amendment only with the CU. Over the next
several months, Catt initiated a public relations campaign that left no doubt in the
President's mind that NAWSA, too, supported the federal amendment but would pursue
it in such a manner that did not threaten him or the Democratic Party.
CU Activity in 1916
In the first few months of 1916, the CU solidified its strategy for making suffrage an
issue in the fall election. In February, Blatch expressed optimism to Paul that the threat
ofwomen voters abandoning the Democrats in the West was forcing the Democratic
leadership to be more responsive to the issue. She explained that she had written to the
heads of both political parties in all the Western states requesting a hearing with them on
behalf of the CU. To Paul she confided, "I think it is interesting that the Democratic
Committees are replying so much more readily. Evidently, the Congressional Union has
Tumulty to Wilson (undated), PWW, Box 89, Reel 209.
Tumulty to Wilson (July 27, 1916), PWW, Box 89, Reel 209.
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filled them with some fear."67 Fueled by this sort of optimism, Paul called a meeting of
the CU National Advisory Council in early April to focus efforts in the West and make
the threat ofwomen voters even more credible.
In a memo written at the meeting's conclusion, the chair of the Advisory Council
summarized the proceedings. She explained that the council had decided to form a
National Woman's Party (NWP) whose basis it would be to place suffrage above
allegiance to any other political party. Enfranchised women of the West would be urged
to join the NWP and use their voting power to press for immediate passage of the federal
amendment. The council also decided to hold a formal founding convention for the new
party in Chicago in June 1916 to coincide with both the Republican and Progressive Party
National Conventions. 68 Paul sent letters to CU leaders in each of the Western states
reiterating the new strategy and urging them to attend the convention in Chicago. She
used the letters to amplify her strategy, reasoning, "We hope that if the political leaders
see the women voters are forming an independent party they will regard the suffrage
question as a more serious one than they have considered it in the past."69
Blatch gave the keynote speech at the Chicago convention. She demanded that the
enfranchised women of the nation take a stand against the Democrats unless they passed
the federal amendment:
I know that we have never had a greater instance of the control over legislation by
the Party in power than at the present time. I know that the Party in power today, the
dominant Party - my Party - controls the White House, controls the Senate, and
67
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controls the House of Representatives; and you know what that means. They controlvery committee in the House of Representatives and in the Senate. They dete^ nelegislation Now you and I are voters in the Suffrage states, controlling ninetyTne
it iTu VOtes ' controllin8 one-fourth of the United States Senate and one-six h of the House of Representatives. Are we going to sleep? Are we going to
sentimentalize? Are we going to run after this Party or that Party? Or are we going
to stand for the biggest principle that any group of enfranchised people have everbeen called upon to stand for?70
Blatch went on to claim that the Woman's Party would deliver 500,000 votes against the
Democratic Party in the 1916 election unless it pledged its support to the federal
amendment.
In the days that followed, the Progressives and Republicans held their national
conventions. Suffrage was an issue of debate for both parties. In the end, the rapidly
shrinking and increasingly politically insignificant Progressive Party endorsed the federal
amendment in their platform while the Republicans took a more moderate stance, urging
the extension of suffrage but recognizing the right of each state to settle the question for
itself. In his acceptance of the Republican Presidential nomination in August, Charles
Evan Hughes went a step further offering his personal endorsement of the federal
suffrage amendment. Nevertheless, in early June it appeared that the Progressives
favored a federal amendment while Republicans only supported a states' rights version of
suffrage. The attention of all suffragists then turned to the Democratic National
Convention in St. Louis, which was held the following week.
When the Democrats adopted a plank similar to the Republicans, endorsing suffrage
only as an issue to be decided by the states, the NWP earnestly began campaigning
against all Democrats in the western states. An overwhelming amount of evidence points
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to the conclusion that this was a strategy based on faulty assumptions, which did nothing
to further the cause of suffrage. The major assumptions that failed the Woman's Party
were that women would behave as single-issue voters willing to place suffrage for
women in other parts of the country above any other concerns, that they would view
Wilson as anti-suffrage because he was the head of the Democratic party and a federal
amendment had not been passed during his first term, and that a majority of people would
understand their strategy of campaigning against all Democrats even if they supported
suffrage. In reality, women voters were concerned with a wide range of issues in the
1916 election. Wilson's affirmative vote in New Jersey and willingness at the St. Louis
Convention to support the suffrage plank, limited though it was, convinced many voters
that he was actually an advocate for the cause. A tiny minority abandoned their
traditional party allegiance to join the Woman's Party, while a vast majority, suffragists
and anti-suffragists alike, were convinced that the campaign against all Democrats
damaged the suffrage movement.
One of the best illustrations of women's refusal to behave as single-issue voters
comes from a set of correspondence between Alva Belmont and a number of Western
women voters. Belmont served as the Chairman of the NWP's Campaign Fund
Committee during the 1916 election year. In September, she sent a letter to 20,000
women voters asking them to donate money in an attempt to raise $500,000 for the
upcoming campaign. Her letter explained that the NWP needed additional funds because,
"Mr. Wilson and his party have steadfastly opposed the woman suffrage amendment in
Congress. The Woman's Party is campaigning, therefore, in the states where women
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vote, against Mr. Wilson and the Democratic Congressional candidates."71 She received
hundreds of responses, overwhelming negative. A snapshot of those responses illustrates
the posture ofwomen in the West.
A woman in Kansas responded that knowing that the Republican candidate
supported a federal suffrage amendment was not enough to cause her to vote for him.
She wrote, "The women of Kansas have the suffrage and it is valuable to them only as it
is used to gain for themselves or humanity the things most desired. We are anxious to
know [Hughes'] attitude on a number of questions; vis: Child Labor law, Universal
compulsory military service, taxes on income, inheritances and munitions."72 She went
on to express scepticism that Hughes' interest in suffrage extended beyond his near-term
desire to be elected. She questioned Belmont, "Has all this enthusiasm for woman
suffrage been awakened merely to get votes - women's votes - to help make himself
President
... His election would in no way advance the suffrage cause and on the other
hand defeat much very necessary legislation. 73
A woman who described herself as an "earnest advocate of women's suffrage" sent a
similar response to Belmont. She was even more specific about Wilson's appeal over
Hughes. In refusing to donate any funds to the NWP, she explained that Wilson "had
done so much for our country. A man who has stood by the wage earning people. I think
the woman's suffrage party in campaigning against Mr. Wilson is all wrong. And you
71
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will find in the end that you have gained nothing."74 She further added her belief that
Wilson's support of the states' rights stanee of the Democratic Party did not mean that he
personally did not support a federal amendment. This letter indicates two important
points. First, that the writer believed Wilson's support of wage-earning people was more
significant than his party's failure to secure a federal suffrage amendment - further proof
that the belief in suffrage as an issue women would weigh more heavily than all others
was false. Secondly, that Wilson had successfully used his party's adherence to states'
rights as a protective barrier for his personal views. Despite the fact that he had never
wavered from the party's position that suffrage was an issue to be decided by the states,
many women were hopeful that because he was in favor of the principle of suffrage, he
was not personally opposed to a federal amendment.
A respondent from Oregon blasted Belmont and the NWP for their strategy, echoing
the belief that Hughes only supported the federal amendment in order to gain votes and
that he knew the bill would first have to gain the support of two-thirds of Congress before
he would ever have to deal with it. She pointed out that the suffrage amendment had
lingered in Congress for twenty years under Republican administrations and that the
amendment had come further under Wilson than any of his Republican predecessors. In
a sharp rebuke of the entire NWP strategy, she wrote,
In this state the majority of the women are standing for Wilson and the suffrage
cause has long many of its best workers because of the foolishness of the
congressional union [sic] and the woman's party in trying to throw the Oregon
women's vote to Hughes. You are definitely injuring the cause of suffrage among
Oregon women. We will never again work together as we did before the split which
you and your followers have forced upon us. You are causing the same split in other
states and therefore you have given suffrage the greatest setback that it could be
74
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given. It will take at least ten years of hard work by the saner women to overcometl* blow you have gxven suffrage in trying to force your candidate forprSS upon
This woman clearly represented the views of those who not only continued to support
Wilson but also were distraught over the damage being caused by the NWP's misplaced
assault on the Democratic Party.
In an almost identical letter, Mrs. W.F. LeSueur from Arizona contradicted all three
of the assumptions on which the NWP's strategy was based. She wrote, "President
Wilson can and will get suffrage for women quicker, than would his opponent. In my
opinion he has accomplished more in the last three and half years than has the
Republicans in twenty years [sic]. I do not think that Mr. Hughes would be equal to the
big questions now confronting, and that will confront our nation."76 LeSueur's letter
demonstrates that the "big questions" facing the United States weighed more heavily on
the minds of many voters than did suffrage. Additionally, her response indicates the
belief held by many that Wilson was actually an advocate for suffrage and to campaign
against him and the other Democrats would only hurt the movement.
The replies to Belmont's request for financial aid are not the only sources of
evidence that an overwhelming majority ofwomen rejected the NWP's strategy, although
the actual words of western women are perhaps the strongest testimony. Subsequent
correspondence suggests that Belmont's September 1916 plea for donations to the cause
went largely unanswered. Less than four months after her call for funds, she was forced
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to send another letter to previous contributors asking for financial assistance. She wrote,
"Our treasury is empty and our work is seriously crippled for lack of funds."77 The
women she had solicited in September apparently spoke with both their pens and their
checkbooks. The NWP's membership numbers are even more compelling. In early
1917, the number of women from suffrage states that had joined the Woman's Party was
only 14,277 - a far cry from the 500,000 voters that Blatch had promised in June 1916. 78
Part Ofthe problem for the NWP resided with the fact that Paul's strategy, though
defensible if given proper scrutiny and full hearing, seemed counterintuitive to most
voters who quickly dismissed it without a full hearing. Paul's explanation of the strategy
to one of the leaders of the Woman's Party in Colorado, illustrates this point. She wrote,
"Our interest, of course, is in securing the passage of the amendment and not in securing
the election of Hughes, but it is vital to the success of the amendment, I think, that we
secure the defeat of Wilson and the election of Hughes."79 Paul had a hard time
convincing people that she was not interested in electing Hughes - only defeating
Wil son; with only a subtle difference in purpose, the propositions were one and the same
Additionally, Paul's method of measuring the success of the movement differed from
that of most people who believed supporters should be won over rather than coerced. She
went on in the same letter to the supporter in Colorado to justify her methods:
It seems to us that we gain more publicity by our campaign of opposition than we
could by one of support. In Colorado two years ago ... we succeeded in making
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a^nstVu s^TI T5.*""T^ "nd °btaining 50 much Publidty «* our fightgains [U.S. Senator] Thomas that even now, two years later, he is still makinu
frTwP me" h V
Mted
,
StateS Senate d~* °- -™P-g" against b£ Had[NW mbers simply gone m as speakers supporting Mr. Thomas' opponent theycould not possibly, believe, have created the furor in the state in whichThey did byheir policy of attacking Thomas and pointing out the reasons for not having him
returned to Washington. 80 B
The problem with Paul's assessment is that Thomas was a pro-suffrage Senator who had
worked to secure suffrage for women in Colorado and voted in favor of the federal
amendment repeatedly in the U.S. Senate. Paul considered the NWP's campaign against
Thomas a success, despite the fact that they had been working against a long-time
suffrage supporter and that he was re-elected despite their efforts to defeat him. This type
of "success" was not attractive to the vast majority of voters.
If anything, the NWP's 1916 campaign strategy only made the suffrage battle
difficult. After Wilson was re-elected and the Democrats maintained control of the
House and Senate, the Republicans owed the NWP nothing since the women's vote had
not carried them to victory. Furthermore, many Democratic suffrage supporters backed
away from the cause because they were made to feel as if it conflicted with their party
loyalty. Most importantly, much-needed Democratic support in Congress had been
alienated by the NWP's campaigns in the West. NWP member Maud Younger reported
in January 1917 that Representative Hayden of Arizona, a long-time suffrage supporter in
the House, had rejected her request to delay a vote on premature vote on suffrage that
would surely end in defeat for the amendment. Hayden had told her that if the NWP was
in favor of delaying the vote, than he was in favor of rushing it, even if it meant defeat for
the amendment. He explained that he was in favor of anything the NWP opposed
|
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because they had fought against him in his last campaign. 81 If this was the type of
response the NWP generated from Congressmen who supported suffrage, they stood little
chance of winning the votes of those who opposed the amendment.
NAWSA Activity in 1916
NAWSA activities in 1916 reflected the beliefs of its leader, Catt, just as much as the
CU's activities reflected the leadership of Alice Paul. The two major tenets of Catt's
strategy in 1916 were remaining steadfast to the policy of nonpartisanship and
distinguishing NAWSA from the CU. In the first years of her presidency, Catt found
herself not only defending the policy of non-partisanship to the public, but also fending
off partisan overtures from close friends and members of her own organization. So what
was it about NAWSA' s traditional policy that drove Catt to defend it with such
vehemence? She answered that question in numerous articles, letters, and interviews by
claiming that holding the party in power responsible simply would not work to secure
suffrage for all women. It was not a personal issue for the always-pragmatic Catt.
Rather, she simply did not believe it was an approach that could succeed. With
constitutional rules requiring a vote of two-thirds of the national legislature in order to
send an amendment to the states for ratification, the amendment necessarily required
bipartisan support. State ratification, as well, required bipartisan support. Therefore,
suffragists could not afford to draw the hostility of either party.
Despite what seemed blatantly obvious to Catt as the correct path for NAWSA,
women whom she respected and worked with occasionally challenged the traditional
1
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policy. In July 1916, Catt received a letter from the President of Bryn Mawr College, ML
Cary Thomas. Thomas, an active suffragist and a long-time national leader of the battle
for greater educational opportunities for women, wrote only a few weeks after both the
Republican and Democratic National Conventions had adopted a suffrage plank for their
party platforms, but during which neither endorsed the federal amendment. Thomas
suggested that Catt meet with the Republican presidential candidate, Charles Evan
Hughes, and urge him to publicly support the federal amendment and promise to try and
get Congress to pass it if he were elected. NAWSA should offer their pledge of support
to Hughes in the upcoming election unless the Democrats passed a federal amendment in
the final session of the 1916 Congress.
Thomas went on to suggest that Catt then meet with President Wilson and explain
her plan to support Hughes in the upcoming election unless the Democrats pushed the
federal amendment through in the next two months. She felt that the fear of losing the
election in the fall would force Wilson to rally his party and push the amendment through
Congress. Even if it did not, all the nation's suffragists (CU, NAWSA, Progressives)
would be united in their support of Hughes and the Republican ticket, and, following
their election to office, "the federal amendment will at last be passed especially as the
Republican congressmen who have been campaigned for by women will feel a sense of
obligation to them such as they have never yet felt."82 Thomas' letter had genuine appeal.
8Z Thomas to Catt (July 4, 1916), CLOC, Box 29, Reel 19. Interestingly, this letter
contradicts the account of Thomas' relationship to the suffrage movement offered in
Helen Lefkowitz Horowitz, The Power and Passion ofM. Carey Thomas (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1994). Horowitz asserts that Thomas' interest and participation ended
after the death of her companion, Mary Garrett, in April 1915. According to Horowitz,
Thomas' last suffrage activity was her attendance of the December 1915 NAWSA
«;i
She predicted a reunification of suffrage forces under one banner supporting Hughes and
success for the federal amendment. Catt, however, was not swayed.
Even after Hughes was convinced by the CU to come out in support of national
suffrage in his July 15, 1916 nomination acceptance speech, Cart refused to give him
NAWSA's endorsement. She continued to speak of suffrage as inevitable because of its
bipartisan appeal. In an article written after Hughes' announcement in July but before the
November elections, she reiterated her non-partisan approach, assuring voters that no
national party opposed suffrage. "The two dominant parties in their suffrage planks
recommended that the question should be settled by the States, but neither declared
against the Federal method. Mr. Charles E. Hughes, the Republican candidate, has
openly declared for the Federal Amendment. Mr. Wilson, at this time, does not yet
endorse it, but many democrats in Congress have not only spoken and voted for it, but are
earnest advocates of it."83 Wilson's later actions in his second term indicated that by
refusing to endorse Hughes over Wilson, Catt endeared herself and NAWSA to the
President.
Thomas was not the only one urging Catt to reconsider her non-partisan path. At the
NAWSA Atlantic City Convention in September 1916, one of the delegates made a
motion that NAWSA support only those candidates who had spoken out in favor of the
federal amendment - namely Hughes. The motion attracted many of the women who
were frustrated with the slow rate of progress and saw a partisan approach leading to
quicker victory. Catt spoke in opposition to the proposal and was supported by her
National Convention (p. 435). This letter from July 1916 suggests that Thomas remained
interested and at least marginally engaged with the suffrage movement beyond that point.
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predecessor, Dr. Anna Howard Shaw. After two hours of debate, the motion was
defeated, and the delegates passed a subsequent resolution to initiate a vigorous publicity
campaign to make clear the association had indeed decided to maintain their non-partisan
policy. 84
Despite challenges from within and outside the organization, Cart navigated
NAWSA through the tempting waters of partisan politics. President Wilson's reaction to
her dedication to this principle can be measured by his increasing responsiveness to her
requests for support. After his successful re-election in the fall of 1916 by a close margin
of 276 electoral votes against 255 for Hughes, Catt was able to repeatedly call on the
President for support in state campaigns as well as the federal amendment campaign - a
dynamic to be explored in-depth in the following chapter.
i
Cart's other main 1916 goal - distinguishing NAWSA from the CU - was a focal
point of the emergency NAWSA National Convention she called in Atlantic City, New
Jersey in September 1916. At the convention, she revealed her "Winning Plan" for
securing the federal amendment. In her Presidential address, she informed the audience
that the suffrage movement was in a state of crisis. Arguing the futility of securing
suffrage for all women of the country by the state method and the necessity of the federal
amendment, she exhorted NAWSA to continue to campaign for state suffrage in states
likely to accept an amendment, but not waste efforts in states with an obstinate electorate
or constitutional constructions that made securing amendments almost impossible. In all
84 HWS, Vol. 5, 489-490
cases, the organization would work to influence legislators to vote in favor of the federal
amendment. Repeatedly, she stressed organizational efficiency and unity of effort. 85
The beauty of Catt's Winning Plan is two-fold. First, it recognized the necessity of
winning more state referenda in order to eventually secure a federal amendment. Catt
was well aware that Congressmen were more apt to vote for a federal amendment if they
came from suffrage states. To abandon the campaign in states with large Congressional
delegations such as New York would not only erase the years of work that had been
poured into those campaigns, but also spell defeat for the federal amendment.
Additionally, keeping state suffrage organizations alive would provide the framework
necessary for the eventual ratification campaign that would have to be fought once the
federal amendment passed Congress.
Shortly after issuing her call to NAWSA members to attend the Atlantic City
convention, Catt invited the President to address the assemblage at their closing session.
The President replied in a personal letter to Catt that he would accept the invitation
barring any schedule conflicts, adding a sentence at the end of the letter, "I sincerely wish
86
to come." The evidence suggests that Catt saw Wilson's presence in Atlantic City as a
way to accomplish two goals. First, she hoped his appearance before the convention
could be used in the public relations campaign. Even if he did not come out in support of
the federal amendment, his mere presence at the national convention of an organization
with that end as its stated goal could be interpreted to show his decreasing resistance to
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such a measure. Secondly, she hoped his exposure to a theater mil of dedicated, orderly
suffragists would help facilitate his complete conversion to the ranks of the believers - in
other words, an advocate for the federal amendment.
As expected, the President did not speak explicitly in favor of the federal amendment
during his address. Neither did he, though, insist that suffrage be attained through the
state method. In a marked departure from his past statements, he professed his support
for the principle of suffrage without clearly stating his preference for the issue to be
settled by the states. Wilson said, "We feel the tide [of the suffrage movement]; we
rejoice in the strength of it, and we shall not quarrel in the long run as to the method of
it." Wilson's shift in position was not an unconscious action or a slip of the tongue.
Later correspondence indicates that he intended his remarks at Atlantic City to represent
his openness to a federal amendment heading into the 1916 election. Responding to a
request in October from the Writers Equal Suffrage League for a statement of his
position, Wilson directed his secretary to provide the league with a copy of his Atlantic
City speech. 88
Reminiscing several years later, Catt expressed her belief that it was that night in
Atlantic City when Wilson "yielded to the momentum of the movement which was
rapidly reaching its climax in his administration. [The convention was] the very hour
when conversion to the principle became with him conversion to an obligation to join the
87
"Speech of President Woodrow Wilson at the 48 th Annual Convention of the
National American Woman Suffrage Association" (Septermber 8, 1916), NAWSA
Records, Box 82, Reel 59.
Anna Johnson to Wilson (October 24, 1916), The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, ed.
Arthur S. Link, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986. (Hereafter
referred to as LWWP)
campaign. When Wilson looked out over the audience in Atlantic City, he saw exactly
what Catt wanted him to see - orderly women that cheered him before and after his
speech and who contrasted sharply with the image he held ofCU agitators. This positive
image, she believed, catalyzed Wilson's conversion to the NAWSA cause of a federal
suffrage amendment.
Just two months later, Catt decided to increase the intensity of the public relations
campaign aimed at distinguishing between NAWSA and the CU. NAWSA press
secretary Rose Young wrote to her in November 1916 requesting that she write some
articles to be used in conjunction with personality stories, cartoons, and news items in
order to "get the National American so dominantly featured in relation to the federal
amendment that there won't be any room on the map for the CU. to get a grip on popular
imagination again."90 Catt, concurring with Young's proposal, composed a letter that
Young released to the press. Young indicated on the press release that Catt had written
the letter in answer to three questions: 1) Why the Congressional Union came into
existence 2) Why it advanced a policy contrary to that of the National American Woman
Suffrage Association and 3) What the differences are between the two groups.
Catt effectively used the letter to answer those questions. She explained how the
mixing of the Congressional Committee responsibilities with the Congressional Union
and the violations ofNAWSA principles had led to Paul's decision to part ways with the
National. Furthermore, she provided a detailed explanation of the CU policies of holding
the party in power responsible and abandoning any state suffrage campaigns in favor of
89
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focusing on the federal amendment. In contrast, she explained, "The National looks to
both parties for support of the Federal Amendment and to intensive organization and
vigorous activity within the states, to secure the ratification of the Federal Amendment;
and the National would also secure the vote by suffrage referenda whenever possible."91
Stressing NAWSA's non-partisan approach, focus on the federal amendment, and
continued work at the state level, Catt clearly explained the differences between the two
organizations. She concluded the letter with her personal assessment of the
ineffectiveness of the CU policy of holding the party in power responsible.
By the end of 1916, NAWSA had succeeded in getting both major parties to include
suffrage planks in their national platforms. Like their counterparts in the NWP, they
would have much preferred a plank endorsing the federal amendment, but in that they
were committed to work at both the state and national level, they chose to see the states'
rights planks as a positive step. Through an aggressive publicity campaign, NAWSA
leaders had educated a large number of Americans about the difference between NAWSA
and the CU. More importantly, they had educated the President. Wilson was convinced
enough ofNAWSA's goodwill to speak at its national convention. He did not endorse a
federal amendment, but he certainly was vague enough for most listeners (and readers
who saw the reports of his speech in newspapers across the country) to interpret his
words to mean that he did not oppose the amendment. His mere presence at the
convention was a public relations plume in NAWSA's hat that they used repeatedly
during the final three years of the campaign.
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S7
Wilson's Reaction to Suffrage Pressure in 1916
One of the most important things to note when examining Wilson's approach to the
1916 election is that the issue of suffrage was, at best, a minor concern. The issues that
dominated the campaign were America's involvement in the war in Europe and where the
two major political parties would fall on a broad range of progressive issues. Wilson's
campaign strategy evolved tremendously during the course of 1916, but by the time the
election arrived in November, his platform can be summarized best as peace, prosperity,
and progressivism.
On the international stage, Wilson charted a bold course for the country.
Recognizing that most Americans were opposed to U.S. military intervention in the war
and deeply divided over the causes of the fighting in Europe, he developed a plan for a
mediated peace. First outlined in a speech on May 27, Wilson set forth his vision to end
U.S. isolation by taking the lead in a negotiated peace agreement among the warring
nations of Europe and then committing the nation to participation in a postwar
association of nations that would maintain peace in the future. His plan offended
isolationists but pleased a majority of Americans who enthusiastically supported the
campaign slogan: "He kept us out of war."
Domestically, Wilson needed to regain ground with Progressives he had offended
during the legislative sessions of 1914-1 5. To do so, he gave his personal support to
pending child labor and federal worker's compensation legislation during the summer
session of 1916. These bills faced tremendous opposition from Southern Democrats for
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two reasons. First, many of the Southern senators received key support from the textile
and manufacturing industries that viewed both pieces of legislation as threats to their
autonomy and ability to turn profit. Secondly, the legislation increased the regulatory
power of the federal government - always a move that states' rights supporters found
threatening. 93
Members of Wilson's cabinet insisted that passing this legislation was key for
Wilson's re-election, specifically mentioning the fact that he would win over women
voters who resoundingly supported both bills. Wilson was able to convince the reluctant
members of his own party that Democrats would lose control of both the White House
and Congress unless the two bills were passed. When he had finally won over key
senators from the Southern states, the bills were passed in August 1916.94 Additionally,
Congress passed a Democrat-sponsored revenue bill in September that included the
nation's first progressive income tax - a measure that held wide appeal to farmers,
workers, and members of the lower middle classes.95 By passing the child labor, federal
workmen's compensation, and progressive income tax bills, the Democrats strengthened
themselves against Republican attacks and won over critical Progressive voters in the last
few months before the election.
Needless to say, conservative Republicans and the business interests that supported
them abhorred both Wilson's willingness to end U.S. isolation by engaging in world
politics and the rash of progressive legislation he supported in 1916. Wilson bred
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enemies among many Catholics, as well. A majority of Catholics were of German and
Irish descent, and they tended to believe, despite his arguments to the contrary, that
Wilson was pro-British.96 Those who strongly opposed Wilson were primarily clustered
in the Eastern part of the country, while the South was solidly Democrat. The West and
mid-West, then, would be the determining factor in the 1916 election.
Wilson gambled that the themes of progressivism and peace would win Western
voters. His gamble paid off. In one of the closest elections in U.S. history, Wilson
defeated Hughes by a margin of 274 to 255 electoral votes. With the exception of
Oregon, Wilson won the electoral votes of every state in the West. The headline in the
New York Times read, "Votes of Women and Bull Moose Elected Wilson; Western
Progressives Turned to Him Almost En Masse, but Not Those of the East; Peace a
Powerful Issue."97 The article specifically derided the efforts of the NWP. Under the
banner, "Woman's Party Failed Utterly," it read,
The Woman's Party terrorized the two conventions and frightened them with the
prospect of 'four million votes,' which it held over them as a club. Mr. Hughes was
led to believe that it had the votes and made his celebrated declaration for the
Anthony Federal amendment. The Woman's Party tried to make its threats good and
marshal the Western women for Hughes, but the dispatches received by The Times
showed that it failed utterly. It did have an influence, but the wrong kind. These
dispatches are unanimous in recording the antagonism excited by the activities of the
Woman's Party, and also by the special train of Hughes women which went
campaigning from New York into the West. From many sates come reports that both
these things added greatly to Wilson's vote; from no State comes a report that it
subtracted from that vote. The women, where they broke away from party lines or
where they voted contrary to their men folks, voted for Wilson. They did so
generally on the argument that 'He kept us out of war." In some States, such as
Ibid., 132.
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Washington the influential argument with them was not this one, but the legislative
record which appealed to them as progressives. 98
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Correspondence between Wilson and his closest advisors in the months before the
election indicate that they should not have been at all surprised by women's behavior at
the polls in November. With a much firmer grasp of the relative importance of suffrage
as an election issue than that held by the NWP, they had counted on such behavior all
along.
Wilson was instrumental in the development of the Democratic platform that was
eventually adopted at the St. Louis convention in June. The suffrage plank endorsing the
principle of suffrage but only recommending that the individual states extend the
franchise to women had his full support. Although his speech in Atlantic City just two
months later expressed openness to any method of obtaining suffrage, his sense of
political reality made only this plank possible. During the debate over that particular
plank, the anti-suffrage Governor Ferguson of Texas made a last-minute attempt to have
it removed completely. His motion gained the support of a number of Southerners, which
propelled Cart to telegraph the President and ask him to clarify his position. He promptly
replied that the plank received his approval and that he wished to recommend to the states
that they extend suffrage to women upon the same terms as to men."
The only suffrage plank that had a chance of being adopted in the Democratic
platform was the one that Wilson endorsed. As Ferguson's efforts revealed, even that
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was unsatisfactory to a vocal minority present at the convention. After the newspapers
ran reports of Catt's call to Wilson for clarification of his position, a woman in California
wrote the president, "Who is Carrie Chapman Catt that she can call the President of the
United States to order. Don't fear those four million woman votes in the Suffrage states.
They will vote the democratic ticket." 100 The message to not worry about Western
women abandoning the Democrats over the issue of suffrage was one that Wilson heard
repeatedly over the next four and a half months.
In early August, Daniels relayed a message to Wilson from Representative Keating
from Colorado. Reacting to Hughes' declaration in support of the federal amendment
just a few days earlier, Keating opined that Wilson should not change his states' rights
position. Voters would recognize that he was only changing his position to try and win
votes, and, in fact, a shift at this juncture would only have the opposite effect. Despite
the fact that Keating was an advocate for the federal amendment and desired Wilson's
support, he recommended that the President adhere to the party platform in order to win
the election.
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Similarly, Vice-President Thomas Marshall urged the President to not worry about
the suffrage issue in the wake of Hughes' announcement. Wilson wrote back to
Marshall, thanking him for the advice and adding, "I don't mean to worry about the
woman suffrage question. I have too much confidence in the good sense and public spirit
of the women of the country to believe that they will act as unjustly as some of their
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62
number are predicting." 102 Wilson's most trusted advisor, Colonel Edward House, wrote,
"I am glad you declined to come out for the Susan B. Anthony amendment. It would not
surprise me if Hughes' action would cost him the election if nothing else did. In the long
run your position is better for the suffrage cause." 103 Interestingly, all of this advice came
from members of Wilson's advisory circle who were self-professed suffragists. They
recognized, though, that suffrage would not be the deciding issue of the election and that
a Democratic victory was more important for accomplishing a wide range of Wilsonian
initiatives.
Wilson articulated his position on suffrage during a speech to the Jane Jefferson Club
of Colorado on August 7. He proclaimed his faith that women voters would study the
broad questions facing America and select the candidate that could best handle all of
those questions. Additionally, he criticized Hughes for supporting a federal amendment
when the Republican Party had been unwilling to go that far at their Chicago convention.
He was adamant that he would not disregard the official declaration of his party, but
would do everything within his power to press for suffrage in state referenda. Finally, in
a sign of things to come, he complimented the sacrifices and war service of women in
Europe as proof that women contribute service to their nations just as men do and
therefore deserve equal citizenship.
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Political insiders from the West continued to reassure Wilson that his suffrage
position would not harm him throughout the late summer and early fall of 1916. One of
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Wilson's advisors passed along a letter in late August from Mary Field, "a highly
intelligent woman who knows more about California than anyone I know." Field refuted
the Woman's Party claim that they would be able to sway the woman's vote in the West.
She was confident that women would not vote on a sex basis. Rather, most people in the
West were grateful that Wilson had kept the nation out of war. She continued, "I feel that
Wilson's policy has done for women far more than the endorsement of the franchise
amendment. Far reaching and less obvious are the results of his federal reserve banking
system, his rural credits, his tariff regulations, his industrial relations commission - all of
which have direct, though subtile [sic], effect on the lives of women, especially the
workers.
105
Field's letter, much like the majority of responses to Belmont's request for
financial support ofNWP activities, indicates that women were much more complex
political creatures than the NWP made them out to be.
Wilson even received reassurances from NAWSA leaders that he need not worry
about the Woman's Party activity in the West. Anna Howard Shaw, now retired but still
an honorary member of the NAWSA executive council, told Wilson's campaign manager
that the only thing the NWP would accomplish during the campaign would be harm to
the suffrage cause. She stressed that NAWSA was the largest suffrage group and the one
to whom the President should pay attention. 106 Less than two weeks later, Wilson found
himself being wildly applauded by the assembled members ofNAWSA at the Atlantic
City Convention. His closest advisors, political activists from the West, and the nation's
largest group of suffragists all expressed their support for his stance on suffrage. With
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good reason, he ignored the NWP and ran a successful campaign based on his
accomplishments in the arenas of foreign policy and progressivism.
As 1916 drew to a close, Wilson found himself still in control of the White House
and his party still in control of Congress. He had been narrowly elected, mostly on the
basis of his ability to keep the nation out of war. Events on the world stage, though,
would force him to radically alter America's position on the war in 1917. The crisis in
Wilson's Administration would force Cart to also make a radical change in NAWSA's
policy by convincing the organization to simultaneously work in support of the war and
suffrage. Paul, too, would drastically alter the strategy of the NWP in 1917. Rather than
taking a stand on the war in Europe, Paul initiated a war at the White House gates.
CHAPTER 4
1917: THE YEAR OF DECISIONS
The White House Pickets
Beginning on January 10, 1917, the NWP sent daily delegations of "silent pickets" to
stand outside the White House gates holding banners which read "Mr. President, What
Will You Do For Woman Suffrage?" and "How Long Must Women Wait for Liberty?"
For nearly six months, the police and the President effectively ignored the activists. As
the United States entered the war and patriotic fever swept across the nation, though,
many began to view the picketers as disloyal.
In June, when the NWP banners began to accuse Wilson of hypocrisy by fighting a
war for democracy abroad but denying true democracy at home several picketers were
arrested and imprisoned on charges of obstructing sidewalk traffic. During their
imprisonment, they staged hunger strikes in protest against the illegality of their arrests
and the bad conditions in the prison. The authorities responded by conducting brutal
forced feedings. The picketing, arrests, hunger strikes, and forced feedings that went on
from June through November provided the NWP with intense press coverage. Although
much of it was critical of their actions, NWP leaders believed it helped the cause by
• 1 07
keeping the suffrage issue on the front pages of the nation's newspapers.
Much historiographical debate has centered on the role of the pickets in Wilson's
eventual decision to advocate for the federal amendment. Flexner argues that NWP-
generated histories in the years immediately following ratification of the nineteenth
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amendment greatly exaggerated the impact of the pickets. She concedes that suffrage
received increased publicity as a result of the NWP activity, but believes that more of the
general public and members of Congress were alienated rather than won over to the
cause. Wilson, she argues, was much more influenced by other events in 1917,
particularly his close association with NAWSA and the increasing role women played in
the public after the U.S. entered the war. 108 Morgan mostly agrees with Flexner, although
he allows that an indirect contribution of the NWP was to galvanize NAWSA to greater
action.
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In their close analysis of Wilson's relationship to suffrage in a 1981 article,
Lunardini and Knock wade tentatively into the debate by arguing that the NWP's action
pushed Wilson towards NAWSA, but they take no further stand than that. Responding to
that argument, Sara Hunter Graham maintains that Wilson came out in support of the
federal amendment in December 1917 as a direct result of the NWP picketing campaigns.
The pickets, she claims, succeeded in pointing out the inconsistency of his war aims
about spreading democracy and his administration's indifference to democracy at home.
Graham contends that the pickets posed such a threat to Wilson that he entered into a
conspiracy with NAWSA, major newspaper editors, and the director of his Committee of
Public Information in order to suppress coverage ofNWP activities. 110
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Perhaps inspired by Graham's rebuttal, Lunardini more boldly argues in a later work
that the NWP campaign did succeed in making the point to the President that there would
be consequences to pay if he did not accede to their demands. Those consequences
included losses for Democrats in future elections and loss of positive public opinion as a
result of his administration's harsh treatment of the pickets. 111
A thorough examination of the relevant correspondence and newspaper coverage for
the most intense period of picketing (January-November 1917) reveals that the pickets
were little more than an annoyance to the President. Most of the publicity so coveted by
Paul and her followers was negative, and little publicity appeared outside ofNew York
and Washington, D.C. Rather than being pushed to take more decisive action on the
federal amendment, Wilson found his ability to work for the suffrage cause hampered by
the activities of the NWP. The President regretted the presence of the pickets, not
because of the bad publicity it brought to his administration but because of the bad
publicity it brought to the greater suffrage campaign. 112 From the beginning, but
increasingly so after the war began, Wilson, NAWSA leaders, most of the general public,
See Lunardini, From Equal Suffrage to Equal Rights and Linda G. Ford, Iron-
Jawed Angels: The Suffrage Militancy ofthe National Woman's Party, 1912-1920 (New
York: University Press of America, 1991).
112 Examples of "bad publicity" include the following: The New York Times reported
on January 19, 1917 that Representative Emerson, a Republican Congressman from Ohio,
made a statement in Congress that he supported suffrage by both the state method and the
federal amendment, but that he opposed the tactics of the pickets. Representative
Emerson stressed to his colleagues that the pickets did not represent most suffragists. See
New York Times, January 19, 1917. The NYT carried a letter to the editor the following
day, again from a suffrage supporter, who called the policy of picketing the president
"idiotic." See New York Times, January 20, 1917.
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and even a significant number ofNWP loyalists thought the picketing campaign was
ineffective and, in fact, harmful to the cause.
So, what exactly was the picketing strategy, why did it appear, and how did Wilson
respond to it as it evolved over the course of the year? The NWP Executive Council
released a statement to the press on January 9, 1917 that they had met with the President
and that he had declined to support the federal amendment, citing his allegiance to the
Democratic Party's platform. At an "indignation meeting" held that afternoon, the
Council had resolved to initiate a new campaign against the President. Their press
release explained that they intended to post women pickets at the White House grounds in
order to make it impossible for the President to enter or leave the White House without
encountering a picket pleading for the cause of suffrage. 113
Wilson's initial reaction was to view the pickets as a sort of amusing distraction. He
would tip his hat to them as he came and went from the White House. On the first
extremely cold day that the pickets stood at their post, he instructed his chief usher to
invite the women into the lower corridor of the White House in order to escape the wind.
When they declined, he ordered the usher to deliver hot bricks to the gate for the women
to use for some warmth. 114 He joked with members of his Cabinet that he actually liked
the pickets because they brought him prominence. 115
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An article in the New York Times reveals that Wilson was not the only one amused
by the pickets. The Gridiron Club of Washington held a dinner for the President and
several members of his Cabinet in February. A group of actors performed a series of
comedy acts in which they parodied recent political events. The article reported that the
actors introduced a character named "Hazel Jones" as one of the silent suffrage sentinels
at the White House. "Hazel" was then made the target of several gibes in a minstrel skit,
demonstrating that most members of the audience viewed the pickets as a group of crazy
women. The newspaper related one specific joke, "'Do you know Hazel had an awful
accident?
. . .
One of those big fat squirrels in the White House grounds bit off her ear.
The President said it wasn't the squirrel's fault, and the President was right . . . Suppose
you were a hungry squirrel with an appetite for nuts, and for eight hours in the rain and
snow and sleet somebody stood in front of your house.'"" 6 The pickets were mocked
again when actors portraying Ellis Island officials quizzed an immigrant about his
knowledge of America. When they asked the immigrant what President Woodrow
Wilson spent most of his time doing, the man responded, "Dodging women with yellow
flags [the color ofNWP banners]." 117
The President was forced to give the pickets more careful consideration beginning in
late June. On June 20, a group of delegates from the new Russian Republic that had just
enfranchised its women arrived at the White House to meet with Wilson. They were
greeted by an NWP banner that read, "President Wilson and Envoy Root are deceiving
Russia. They say lWe are a democracy. Help us win the war so that democracies may
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survive.' We women of America tell you that America is not a democracy. Twenty
million women are denied the right to vote." 1 18 The banner went on to say that Wilson
was the chief opponent of suffrage in America. It urged the Russian delegation to tell
Wilson he must enfranchise women before claiming Russia as an ally. The inflammatory
banner drew a crowd of opponents who ripped the banner to shreds. A similar scene
occurred on the following day when NWP members arrived at their posts with an
identical banner. On that day, the crowd not only tore apart the banner, but some also
physically attacked the pickets and had to be restrained by the police. 119
The incident surrounding the "Russian banner" received considerable press
coverage. Over the next two weeks, a pattern developed in which the pickets would
arrive at their posts, be attacked by unruly crowds, and then be arrested. Initially, the
police claimed that the arrests were for their own protection, although later the pickets
were charged with obstructing sidewalk traffic. Wilson did not make any public
statements during this time, but privately he confided his disappointment in the type of
publicity being drawn to suffrage. He wrote to his daughter on the day of the second
crowd attack, "I dare say you heard of the fracas raised by the representatives of the
Woman's Party here at the gates of the White House. They certainly seem bent upon
making their cause as obnoxious as possible."
On July 1 4, sixteen women were arrested on the charges of causing unlawful
assembly before the White House. In court three days later, the women received fines,
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but refused to pay, so were sentenced to varying periods of confinement at Occoquan
Workhouse in Virginia. According to the Commissioner of the District of Columbia,
Louis Brownlow, the President was not told beforehand that the arrests were going to be
made, and he was indignant when he found out afterwards. He immediately pardoned the
women and ordered Brownlow to his office. Brownlow recalled that Wilson clearly
disapproved of the arrests because it only indulged the women in their desire to be
considered martyrs. The President ordered Brownlow to refrain from further arrests
without his approval. 121
When fighting between the pickets and the crowds continued over the next few days,
Brownlow reported to the President that he needed to make more arrests. Wilson agreed
that Brownlow should take minimum measures necessary to maintain peace on the
streets. Brownlow recalled, "Thereafter we pursued a policy of attempting to keep the
peace, not arresting the pickets until they, or at least some of them, had taken positive
* 1 22
action." Brownlow' s memory of the events, written more than 40 years later, was
undoubtedly affected by his desire to appear concerned for the safety of the pickets rather
than guilty of committing serious breaches of their first amendment rights.
I will not make the argument that Wilson was unconcerned with publicity, but I will
dispute Graham's contention that he engaged in a conspiracy to suppress the facts
involved in the picketing arrests and imprisonment. Wilson's secretary, Tumulty,
informed him on the day after he had pardoned the sixteen pickets that several editors of
121
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prominent newspapers had inquired how the White House would like them to cover the
events. T.W. Noyes, editor of the Washington Evening Star, told Tumulty that he
favored having a bare statement of fact, but no publicity in any paper. Arthur Brisbane,
editor of the Washington Times suggested that the Administration avoid the appearance
of any "conspiracy of silence." Wilson instructed Tumulty, "My own opinion is that a
compromise course ought to be adopted
. . .My own suggestion would be that nothing
that [the pickets] do should be featured with headlines or put on the front page but that a
bare colorless chronicle of what they do should be all that was printed. That constitutes
part of the news, but it need not be made interesting reading." 123
Graham contends, "At NAWSA's instigation, President Wilson and the wartime
censorship agency abridged the freedom of the press" in order to suppress news about
1 24NWP activities. She finds evidence for this conspiracy in Wilson's instructions to
Tumulty (as noted above) and in a report from NAWSA lobbyists that the CPI Director,
George Creel, arranged appointments for them with major news services. The purpose of
the appointments was for the NAWSA lobbyists to emphasize their desire for newspaper
coverage to make a clear distinction between NAWSA and the NWP and to emphasize
the former's abhorrence of the picketing. Creel's office also issued an official bulletin to
all newspapers, post offices, government officials, and public agencies on July 3, 1917, in
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The President clearly preferred that the pickets not receive the type of publicity that
they were seeking, but Graham's own review of prominent newspapers reveals that the
next major set of arrests in August received front page coverage. 126 If Wilson attempted
to suppress news coverage, and there really is no evidence beyond the correspondence
outlined above that he did any such thing, the attempt failed. Furthermore, his alleged
suppression was clearly not much of a priority since there is no evidence that Wilson or
Creel took punitive action against any of the major newspapers that continued to give
front-page coverage to the pickets.
When viewed in comparison to the administration's suppression campaign against
anarchists, I.W.W.'s, and Socialists, the plan to ask newspapers to provide "colorless"
coverage of the pickets appears relatively benign. 127 For example, the postmaster general
denied second-class mailing privileges to leftist publications such as the Milwaukee
Leader, the Appeal to Reason, and the Masses, resulting in the virtual shut-down of those
publications. Additionally, Socialist leader Eugene Debs was sentenced to ten years in
prison for speaking out against American participation in the war. 128 Given that most of
Graham reviewed coverage of the arrests and riots of 14-18 August 1917 and
found front page stories in the Evening Star (Washington), Washington Times,
Washington Post, New York Times, New York World, New York Tribune, New York
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the articles about arrests were critical of the NWP, anyway, Wilson had even less
motivation to try and limit the exposure. There is no doubt that NAWSA leaders worked
closely with the administration, including the CPI, to distance themselves and the cause
of suffrage from the militants. However, the fact that NAWSA and Wilson were in
agreement on the damage to the cause being inflicted by the NWP does not equate to a
conspiracy to "abridge the freedom of the press."
The argument that Wilson resorted to arrests to try and silence the pickets who were
arousing public opinion against him is even less convincing when one sees the number of
letters that Wilson received criticizing him for being overly lenient with the pickets. A
woman in Missouri wrote to him in late July demanding that he put a stop to the "un-
American" picketing of the White House. In August, a man who had witnessed the
fighting between pickets and crowd members and the subsequent arrests, defended the
actions of the crowd, saying, "An indignant public should be allowed to deal with such
banners according to the dictates of their patriotism without police interference." 129 The
actions of the crowd, of course, also led Wilson to believe that the opinion of the pickets
was a tiny minority. He did receive advice and petitions from those who supported the
pickets, some ofwhom were prominent citizens, but there is no evidence that any of these
appeals caused Wilson to alter his suffrage stance. 130
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When he received letters from people concerned about the conditions in which the
jailed suffragists were kept at the Occoquan Workhouse, he directed his staff to
immediately investigate the charges and take any such action as needed to ensure there
was no basis for future charges.
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In late November, the 31 suffragists currently in jail
appeared before a District Judge who ruled that they had been illegally committed to
Occoquan Workhouse and were entitled to liberation on bail pending an appeal. After
their release, they did not picket again until the summer of 191 8. 132
York, Dudley Field Malone printed in New York Times, September 8, 1917 and Wilson to
Malone (September 12, 1917), Life and Letters, Vol 7.
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See Wilson to Tumulty (October 23, 1917) and (November 16, 1917), Life and
Letters, Vol 7. See also William Gwynn Gardiner to Wilson (November 9 1917)
LWWP.
In her article, Graham repeats the story told in Irwin, The Story ofthe National
Woman's Party, 261., that a reporter from the New York Post, David Lawrence, was sent
by Wilson to meet with Paul in prison. Lawrence allegedly offered a deal to Paul:
Wilson would guarantee that the suffrage amendment would pass by the end of 1919 if
she would agree to end the picketing. Graham says that Paul's answer is unknown, but
speculates that she agreed based on the following evidence: The pickets' sentences were
overturned the following week and they were released from jail. The NWP then
refrained from any further picketing and Wilson advocated passage of the federal
amendment to the House in January 1918. There is an overwhelming amount of evidence
that indicates Irwin's version of events is simply incorrect. The story published by David
Lawrence in The Evening Post makes no mention of the alleged deal. See The Evening
Post, November 27, 1917, "For and Against Suffrage Pickets." Lawrence denied at the
time that he was an emissary from the White House. According to Flexner, he refuted
Irwin's story again in a letter to Flexner prior to her first publication of Century of
Struggle. See Flexner and Fitzpatrick, 377, footnote 19. Additionally, the New York
Times reported on November 9 - a week before Lawrence's visit to Paul - that the NWP
planned to stop picketing the White House. During an NWP meeting on November 8 in
New York, volunteers were invited to particpate in the final picket of the White House on
that following Saturday. According to the article, "Miss Doris Stevens said after the
meeting that this would undoubtedly be the last time that the White House would be
picketed." New York Times, November 9, 1917, "Talk of Dropping Capital Pickets."
Finally, Wilson's decision to support the federal amendment was made weeks before
Lawrence's visit to the District Jail. See Catt's report of her meeting with Wilson in New
York Times, November 10, 1917.
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To the greatest extent possible, Wilson ignored the pickets during 1917. When the
publicity surrounding their arrests made it impossible for him to ignore them, he did his
utmost to minimize the publicity they received. Undoubtedly, this was partially an
attempt to keep bad light from falling on his Administration. More importantly, though,
he sincerely believed the pickets were causing harm to the suffrage cause. His growing
interest in the federal amendment was not a result of the coercive actions of the NWP, but
rather the result of its increasing political value as more and more state suffrage
campaigns were won, the U.S. engaged in a war to spread democracy, and Democrats
began to prepare for the 1918 mid-term elections.
NAWSA, unlike the President, could not ignore the pickets. From the start,
NAWSA leaders denounced the silent sentinels of the NWP - continuing the campaign
Catt had started in 1916 to distinguish NAWSA from the CU. Shaw wrote to a close
friend of Wilson's in March 1 9 1 7 expressing her deep regret at the actions of the
Woman's Party and reiterating her continued support for Wilson. After condemning the
pickets, she added, "I fully agree with you that Mr. Wilson intended just what he said at
our National Convention at Atlantic City and what is more he has lived up to his promise.
He has done more for suffrage during the month of February than all of the Presidents
who have even been in the White House." Shaw's friend passed along the letter to
Wilson, emphasizing her belief that the majority of suffragists opposed the pickets.
In response to the wave of publicity after the July arrests, Catt issued an "Open
Letter to the Public" in which she stressed the complete separation ofNAWSA from the
NWP. Pointing out that the NWP was a minority organization, she claimed that the
Shaw to Warren (March 13, 1917), LWWP.
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National represented 98% of the organized suffragists in the United States and was
officially on record as absolutely opposed to the picketing tactics. She urged the press
and public alike to disregard the tactics of the NWP and to grant women suffrage in spite
of the distasteful actions of a small minority. 134 She insisted that readers understand her
organization was the true voice of the suffrage movement in America. In describing the
organization, she boasted, "With its membership of two millions [sic] of women
representative of all the states, it is the essential agent to be reckoned with; that its work
has always been constructive, law-abiding and non-partisan." 135 Catt spoke of the NWP
as a dramatic foil for the National, urging the public to make a clear distinction between
the two groups.
Catt also made sure the President understood that she did not support the pickets.
Prior to his decision to pardon the pickets after the July arrests, she had scheduled a
conference with the President to discuss the negative impact the pickets might have on
upcoming legislative action. After he granted the pardon, the NAWSA Executive
Secretary wrote to Wilson's chief of staff that Catt thought the meeting would be
unnecessary and that it could wait "to a later date when the war measure and the
Congress will bear less heavily upon him . . . His serene and tactful handling of the recent
'picket crisis' cleared the air for a time, at least, and makes the conference unnecessary,
we hope until the close of this Congress." 136 While emphasizing that her organization
134
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disapproved of the pickets, Catt made sure to recognize the other issues facing the
President. This diplomatic and considerate approach was effective in winning the
support of the President and his staff.
As the crucial New York state suffrage campaign neared its climax in the fall of
1917, the NAWSA affiliate in New York passed a resolution protesting against men who
said they planned to vote against the amendment because of the picketing in Washington,
D.C. They denounced the tactics of the NWP and asked the men ofNew York not to
punish them for the acts of a few who were misled into militancy. 137 After New Yorkers
passed the suffrage amendment in November, Catt and other members of the NAWSA
Executive Council requested a meeting with Wilson to thank him for his assistance in
New York and solicit his support for the federal amendment. In the memo requesting the
meeting, Gardener informed the President that the NWP was planning a large
demonstration against him on November 10 and that it would help squelch NWP
publicity if Wilson met with NAWSA members prior to that. 138
Wilson not only met with the group, but also came closer than ever to fully and
publicly endorsing the federal amendment. Catt told the New York Times after the
meeting that the President had agreed to try and push the federal amendment through the
th
65 Congress (opening in January 1918). She explained that the President had promised
to do everything within his power to help the cause
139
137 New York Times, October 2, 1917
138 Memorandum for the President from the White House Staff (November 6, 1917),
LWWP.
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After Cart's meeting with Wilson, his director of the Committee for Public
Information, George Creel, sent him a memo stating that the NWP wanted to have an
audience with him in order to urge the federal amendment. Creel recommended that
Wilson decline to meet with them, saying, "May I advise against such an audience and if
you agree with me will you suggest form of refusal. Mrs. Cart and Dr. Shaw speak for
equal suffrage in the nation and the Congressional Union is without standing and
deserves no recognition." 140 Creel's letter indicates that Cart's campaign to distinguish
NAWSA as the "organization to be reckoned with" fully succeeded.
NWP leaders, though, also believed they had led a victorious campaign in 1917.
Paul spent a period of time in a sanatorium in Baltimore during the summer of 1917
recuperating from exhaustion. Burns filled in as the acting chair of the NWP.
Expressing her confidence in the NWP strategy to a supporter in Rhode Island in late
July, she declared, "We have been passing through a very trying time, but I believe great
good has been accomplished ... We expect to go on picketing during the coming week.
There is great indignation that so many arrests have been made which now apparently can
be proved false." 141 Despite the public outcry against the pickets, Burns was convinced
that a significant number of people were more indignant of their arrests. This was a
belief shared by most NWP leaders. Writing to her comrades who were in jail, NWP
member Beulah Amidon encouraged:
The big world is watching—and learning—and admiring, and pretty soon the job
you're helping at will be done. Can you imagine how it will be when that
amendment actually passes? Sometimes, when I am too tired to think, I just take a
140
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long breath and try to dream of a whole nation politically free-and then there is
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makC th£ dream COme true
-
We had wonderful stories in
the NY, Washington, Phila., and Boston papers this morning, and every batch of
clippings that comes in is bigger and friendlier. 142
Amidon's words were surely encouraging to her comrades in jail. Undoubtedly, she
believed what she was telling them. But her perception that people were "admiring" the
pickets and that the press coverage was friendly was simply wishful thinking.
Upon her return to the NWP ranks in late September, Paul, too, voiced her belief that
the picket strategy was effective. In an argument foreshadowing Graham's article more
than sixty years later, Paul wrote, "The vigor with which the administration is seeking to
crush the picketing indicates, it seems to me, the effectiveness of this form of
agitation."
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Again, Paul's method of measuring success seems skewed. As with her
campaign against the pro-suffrage Senator Thomas of Colorado in 1914, she was
convinced that garnering the hatred of those whose assistance she sought was good for
the cause. The responsiveness of the White House and Congress to NAWSA, who
employed the exact opposite approach, demonstrates just how wrong Paul's philosophy
was.
Enough of the leaders, though. What did the rank and file of the Woman's Party
(small though they were) across the country think of their organization's new direction in
1917? Some were supportive when the picketing first started and before the war began.
A woman in Philadelphia wrote in February, "Don't let people persuade you to withdraw
the 'pickets' from the White House. They are something far more than a spectacle. If
Amidon to Picket-Prisoners (August 23, 1917), NWPP, Reel 2.
Paul to Miss Mary B. Dixon (September 26, 1917), NWPP, Reel 2.
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war should be declared and our country should need our energies ... it will be time
enough then to call in the pickets." 144 Two sisters in New York who pledged $500 to the
NWP in July because they were so inspired by the brave pickets expressed a similar
sentiment. When they actually sent their check in August, they qualified their support,
"We do not feel that the banners which display protest such as Kaiser Wilson are at all
worthy of the cause and we fear may discredit it even among those most sympathetic.
We hope that our contribution will not be used for this part of the work but rather for the
educational propaganda." 145
Perhaps the oddest letter of support came from Mary E. McCumber, the head of the
North Dakota NAWSA affiliate. McCumber, apparently a closet militant, wrote to Paul
to tell her how much she admired her willingness to "fight right on the firing line." She
added that there were "thousands ofwomen scattered over the country who are watching
your achievements with pride and gratitude. 146 We can probably assume with relative
confidence that Paul derived more than a little satisfaction in receiving a letter of support
written on NAWSA stationary.
The bulk of the mail from NWP members, though, was strongly opposed to the
picketing campaign. 147 Many of those who had not been opposed in January and
144 Mary V. to Paul (February 8, 1917), NWPP, Reel 2.
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Irene and Alice Lewishon to NWP (July 20, 1917) and Irene Lewishon to Paul
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This statement is based on the existing letters in the NWP papers. Letters of
opposition to the picket strategy outnumber letters of support by a margin of nearly three
to one. The question remains as to whether those who supported the strategy were as
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February, became so when the U.S. entered the war in March. Many were driven
completely away from the NWP by its actions with regard to the Russian delegation in
June. Two letters in January came from members canceling their pledges because they
thought the picketing was both unwise and ridiculous. 148 The tenor of the letters Paul
received grew much more grave after the incident with the Russian delegation.
In a very analytical note that struck right at the heart of Paul's belief that there was
no such thing as bad publicity, a woman in New Jersey reflected:
Because I believe in the federal amendment and because I believe the war should not
stop the fight for suffrage, I belong to the Woman's Party; and because I have had
confidence in the women in Washington I have said many times to myself that they
know best and the rest of us must stand behind them. But today's paper shakes my
confidence, so untrue and misleading does that [Russian] banner seem to be.
Publicity is certainly gained, but as a great cost.
149
This letter conveys the torn feelings of many NWP members who wanted to continue to
work for the federal amendment but were uncomfortable with the militant course Paul
charted for their organization.
When Paul sent out a mass mailing requesting funds in late June, many of the
recipients took the opportunity in their replies to voice their displeasure with the
motivated to write to the NWP leadership and voice their opinions as those who opposed
the strategy. The majority of all correspondence from rank and file members of the NWP
back to the headquarters deals with donations. Respondents are usually answering a call
to send in money that they had previously pledged or that members of the NWP
Executive Council had solicited them for. Given that as the basis of the correspondence,
it seems that supporters and opponents of the picketing strategy would have the same
motivation to write to the NWP headquarters. If the motivation to write is, indeed, equal,
than the raw ratio of 3 : 1 accurately portrays strong opposition to the picketing strategy
within the NWP.
148 Mary P. Smith to CU (January 11,1917) and Perle Shale Kingsbury to Maud
Younger (January 25, 1917), NWPP, Reel 2.
149 Mary Everett to Paul (June 21,1917), NWPP, Reel 2.
picketing (and to decline to send any money). The Chair ofNAWSA's Massachusetts
state association wrote that she was convinced that the work of the NWP was delaying
rather than helping the federal amendment. In her state, she reported, the tactics of
picketing and heckling the President repelled both men and women. 150 Similarly, a
woman in Illinois who confessed that she subscribed to the NWP newspaper, The
Suffragist, refused to send money saying, "I do not believe that Mr. Wilson is our greatest
enemy, though I have been impatient at his attitude, nor do I think that we gain by
holding a party as a party responsible." 151
From the far side of the country came a major blow to the NWP leadership in early
July. Elizabeth Kent, a member of the NWP Executive Committee, and an extremely
active campaigner in California, tendered her resignation on July 9. She telegrammed
Paul, "Have greatest respect for your judgment but feel that present methods are not my
methods and therefore I cannot honestly remain on board." 152 Kent had been supportive
of the initial picketing strategy, but the Russian banner had been too much for her to
handle. Many less prominent members of the organization echoed her sentiments. 153
During the fall of 1917, a number of letters from women not located in the urban-
industrial center ofNew York or the political hub in Washington, D.C. warned that the
NWP was losing the publicity war in most other parts of the country. An NWP member
in Mississippi reported, "I do "my bit' in your defense whenever I can get in a word.
15U Grace Johnson to Paul (July 2, 1917), NWPP, Reel 2.
151 Colby to Paul (July 8, 1917), NWPP, Reel 2.
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was
Through much garbled and prejudiced news reports the sentiment, and emphatically
among suffrage enthusiasts, is violently against you." 154 A Tennessee woman
complained that the papers in her area refused to print the NWP publicity bulletins and
instead published articles critical of the pickets. The Woman's Party, she lamented,
losing almost all of its members in Tennessee. From Georgia came a report that the
Atlanta Constitution refused to publish anything about the pickets as an interview or as an
article of news. 155
Publicity was stymied in other ways, too. A representative of the Bar Association,
upon receiving circulars and tickets concerning a mass meeting by the NWP to describe
their prison experiences, wrote back to the NWP Headquarters that he had received the
materials too late to announce it at the meeting of the Bar Association, but would not
have announced it even if he had received them earlier. He explained, "I am thoroughly
in favor of Woman's Suffrage but have no toleration whatever for the conduct of the
Pickets which has disgraced this city for some months past." 156
Beulah Amidon's inspiring letter to her comrades in jail failed to take these types of
sentiments into account. The women who braved freezing cold weather in the winter and
steaming temperatures in the summer, angry crowds and indifferent police, dirty prison
cells and forced feedings, exhibited tremendous courage and dedication to their cause.
The violations of their civil liberties is a black mark on the history of the United States,
154 Mary Houston to Paul (September 1,1917), NWPP, Reel 2.
155 Memo to Paul from the Tennessee Branch of the CU (September 3, 1917) and
Memo to Gertrude Fendel (December 9, 1917), NWPP, Reel 2.
156 Easby-Smith to Emory (December 5, 1917), NWPP, Reel 2.
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and especially on all those who supported the cause of suffrage but stood by as the
pickets were arrested for exercising their right to free speech. Neither their bravery nor
the injustices they suffered, though, changes the fact that their actions were harmful to the
greater suffrage cause. Specifically aimed at the President, their actions only made the
positive work he did for the suffrage cause in 1917 even more difficult at a time when his
difficulties were legion.
1917's Main Event: War
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the primary reason for Wilson's re-election
was the support he received from people who believed he had kept the nation out of the
war in Europe. His bold plan for a mediated peace had appealed to Americans deeply
divided over the cause of the war and fearful of ending America's neutrality. In the
month after his narrow election victory, he constructed a plan for a peace conference. As
a first step toward the realization of that vision, he sent a memo to both the Allies and the
Central Powers asking for a clear statement of their war aims. Their responses in early
January demonstrated just how difficult a mediated peace would be, for their visions of a
just post-war settlement were vastly different. Nonetheless, Wilson felt comfortable in
giving his "peace without victory" speech to Congress on January 22, 1917.
Unbeknownst to him at that time, the German leadership had already decided to resume
their unrestricted submarine warfare in an attempt to speed the end of the war. This
action was a direct violation of the Sussex Pledge the Germans had given Wilson in May
1916. In that accord, the German government had agreed to refrain from attacking
merchant vessels and liners without warning. The German ambassador informed the
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President of the submarine warfare plan on January 3 1 , and Wilson - true to the promise
he had made at the time of the Sussex Pledge - broke off diplomatic relations with
Germany on February 3 rd .
Wilson'
s cabinet urged him to request an armed shipping bill from Congress so that
U.S. merchant ships could defend themselves against attack. Wilson was reluctant to do
so until he learned of the German plan to bring Mexico into a war against the U.S. After
the famous "Zimmerman Telegram" containing the German message to the Mexican
leadership came to light for Wilson on February 24, he asked the Congress to arm
merchantmen on the following day. Illustrating the limits to executive influence, the bill
passed the House but failed in the Senate where staunch neutralists debated it so long that
the Congress expired on March 4 without a vote.
On March 12, a German submarine sank an unarmed American merchant ship - the
first time Germany violated the Sussex Pledge in deed, rather than word. That same day
saw the start of the Russian Revolution, widely welcomed in America which had been
troubled by the presence of the authoritarian Tsarist regime's presence among the Allied
Powers. Wilson recognized the new Russian government on March 22.
The President called an emergency session of the new Congress in early April. He
gave his war message to a joint session and uttered the famous phrase, "The world must
be safe for democracy." Angered by the Zimmerman Telegram and the sinking of U.S.
merchant ships, the Senate adopted a statement of war against Germany on April 4 by a
vote of 82-6 and the House adopted it two days later by a vote of 373-50. Congress also
adopted a joint resolution to restrict their debate during that session of Congress to "war
measures" - issues that directly affected America's ability to prosecute the war.
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American troops began arriving in Paris in June. Much of Wilson's time over the
summer was spent negotiating the terms of American Army units' participation in the
war with the Allies. Wilson and his commander, General John J. Pershing, felt strongly
that American troops should fight as a united unit and not be used as individual fillers for
gaps in the Allied armies. Wilson and Pershing's views prevailed, but the negotiations
with the allies were tense and time-consuming.
The second Russian Revolution in November ended Russia's involvement in the war
and made its eventual outcome very unpredictable. In January 1918, Wilson delivered
his famous "Fourteen Points" speech to Congress. The exuberance with which it was
initially received was quickly overshadowed when the Germans initiated a major
offensive in the spring of 1918 that was marginally successful. They were on the move
again in the Marne offensive of July only to be badly defeated, mostly by the fresh U.S.
troops. The Allies began a counterattack in July that succeeded in pushing Germany
back toward her borders over the course of the next few months. The Central Powers
began to crumble in October and, finally, the Germans capitulated and signed the
armistice on November 11, 191 8. 157
It was against this backdrop of world-changing events that Catt developed and
executed the "Winning Plan" she had outlined in Atlantic City. Recognizing that
Congress would be distracted by the war, she made state campaigns the main arena for
NAWSA activity in 1917. As Morgan argues, Catt was content to fight a holding action
in Congress while increasing the eventual number of supportive Congressmen by creating
157
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more suffrage states. She also recognized that participation in the war effort could be
used to demonstrate the full capacity ofwomen and former justify their demands for
equal suffrage. 158
For the majority of her public life, Cart worked simultaneously towards broadening
women's rights and achieving world peace. Before the First World War, she was active
in the Woman's Peace Party. After the war and the passage of the federal suffrage
amendment, she founded the Committee on the Cause and Cure of War, an organization
to which she devoted herself until the end of her life in 1947. Her decision, then, to
support American involvement in World War I may at first seem contradictory. Certainly
many of her comrades from the peace movement believed it was and harshly criticized
her decision.
159
What those comrades-turned-critics failed to grasp was Cart's political
pragmatism. She articulated time and again in letters, articles, and speeches her
conscientious objection to war of any sort, but also her realization that American
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Catt's successful campaign to convince NAWSA to support the war was
extremely controversial and led to the defection of several prominent members.
NAWSA' s National Publicity Director, Elinor Byrns, resigned in the middle of a
speaking tour when she heard that the National's officers had voted to support the war.
She continued to work for suffrage by joining the NWP which had voted to take no stand
on the war. See Nancy F. Cott, The Grounding ofModern Feminism (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1987), 61. Similarly, NAWSA's state leader in Wisconsin, Meta
Berger, defected to the NWP over the issue of war support. See Shelia Rowbotham, A
Century of Women: The History of Women in Britain and the United States (New York:
Viking, 1997), 99. After the United States entered the war, the Woman's Peace Party
split into three factions: one that decided to support the war and devote themselves to war
service, one, led by Crystal Eastman, which resolved to continue agitating for an early
peace, and one, led by Jane Addams, which sought to promote a durable peace settlement
while working for civilian relief at home during the war. See O'Neill, 183-184..
intervention in the war in Europe was inevitable after February 1917. Given that
inevitability, Catt calculated that NAWSA stood a much greater chance of achieving its
objectives if they threw themselves solidly into home front war service while
simultaneously working to secure the federal suffrage amendment. Not only would
NAWSA's war service aid in the public relations campaign to convince voters that
women as citizens fulfilled their obligations just like men and deserved the vote, but it
would also deflect the potential criticism of anti-suffragists who would surely criticize
NAWSA as "unpatriotic" for working towards suffrage while the war was being fought
overseas.
160 When war became inevitable, Catt the pragmatist felt that her decision to
support the war was also inevitable.
The historical record contains several clues to Cart's decision early on to place
suffrage higher on her priority list than her involvement with the peace movement. For
example, when Jane Addams was working to call nationwide mass peace demonstrations
in December 1914, Catt offered her services only so far as her participation did not reflect
poorly on the suffrage campaign. She amplified, "I think it most advisable that the
suffragists should not be the prime mover in this step. When I say that I will undertake
[organizing the demonstration] in New York, I do not mean that I will head the
movement, but that I will get the right people to do it and will give my assistance to it." 161
Always conscious of the public's perception of suffragists, Catt maintained her distance
from potentially damaging relationships with other movements. She continued to be
Van Voris, 137-138.
Catt to Addams (December 4, 1914), CLOC, Box 4, Reel 3.
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casually involved in the Woman's Peace Party until February 1917 when the organization
officially rebuked her for NAWSA's statement of support for the war. 162
February was indeed the crucial month in terms of decisions about the war. On
February 3,1917, Secretary of State Robert Lansing informed Congress that the United
States had broken off diplomatic relations with Germany. On that same day, one of
Cart's closest co-workers at NAWSA, Clara Hyde, wrote to Mary Peck about Cart's latest
activities. She informed Peck, "The second item you should know about is that C.C.C.
dines with President and Mrs. Wilson on Monday night as the guest of Secy. Of War
Daniels and his wife!
!
The old goat is warming up. I'd give a king's ransom to watch
Carrie turn her lamps on him." 163 Wilson's appointment book confirms that he and his
wife dined with Daniels (who was actually Secretary of the Navy) and Catt on February
5, 1917.
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No record exists of what was discussed during their dinner. The events of the
preceding and following days suggest, however, that the impending war was most likely
a topic of conversation along with whether or not NAWSA intended to support the
President should he officially decide to send troops to Europe. Wilson had held a
meeting just four days earlier with the executive officers of the Woman's Peace League
who undoubtedly voiced their continued disapproval of increasing U.S. militancy. 165
ibZ Van Voris, 138. See also New York Times, March 7, 1917, "Peace Party Ousts
Mrs. Carrie Catt."
163 Hyde to Peck (February 3, 1917), NAWSA Records, Box 24, Reel 16.
164 Appointment Books (February 5, 1917), PWW, Box 3, Reel 3.
165 Appointment Books (February 1, 1917), PWW, Box 3, Reel 3.
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It seems more than likely that the President would have inquired if Catt and NAWSA
held the same views as the Woman's Peace League. Whether or not he asked that
question remains a mystery, but the following day Catt issued a call to the Executive
Council ofNAWSA to meet later that month and adopt their official position on the war.
It would seem that Catt felt the question ofNAWSA's position had been asked - if not
explicitly by the President then at least by the circumstances of the day.
In her call to the Executive Council, Catt began by stating, "Our nation is on the
brink of war." She went on to explain that the decision the organization needed to make
was whether "suffragists [should] do the 'war work' which they will undoubtedly want to
do with other groups newly formed, thus running the risk of disintegrating our
organizations or shall we use our headquarters and our machinery for really helpful
constructive aid to our nation. The answer to these questions must be given now." 166
Even before war had been declared, Catt seemed to see the political benefits of making
NAWSA's stand transparent to the public and key politicians alike.
At the meetings of the Executive Council on February 23-25, the members passed a
resolution by a vote of 63-13 pledging their support and service in the event of war.
Although invited, Wilson was unable to attend the final session in which the resolution
was presented to Secretary of War Newton Baker. He did send a letter to the NAWSA
headquarters stating, "The Secretary of War has transmitted to me the resolution
presented to him . . . under the auspices of the National American Woman Suffrage
Association. I want to express my very great and sincere admiration of the action
Catt to Executive Council (February 6, 1917), NAWSA Records, Box 82, Reel 60.
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taken." 167 Wilson expressed his appreciation and admiration in more concrete terms over
the next two years, as he became not only a supporter but also an advocate for the federal
suffrage amendment. In her urgent call for NAWSA to define its position on the war,
Cart rigorously answered any question the President might have had about looking for
support to its two million members. In return, he seems to have answered Catt's question
about his support for national woman's suffrage.
The NWP, too, realized that it must take some position on the war. Paul sent a letter
out to all her state chairmen on February 8th in which she called for a national convention
in March to consider the organization's war policy. In the letter, she stressed that the
organization was dedicated only to the enfranchisement ofwomen and that, until changed
by an action of the convention, that would continue to be the NWP policy. 168 The March
convention voted to sustain the current policy of focusing only on suffrage and remaining
neutral on the issue of the war. What Paul did not anticipate, or ever realize, was that a
majority of Americans saw "taking no stand on the war" as a very active stand. They
viewed the NWP as unpatriotic and harmful to the nation. This, much more so than
opposition to suffrage, was the source of the anger that propelled crowds to attack the
White House pickets.
Paul maintained her belief that NAWSA had forgone suffrage work to participate in
war service throughout the remainder of her life. In an interview given just a few years
before she died in 1977, Paul related the same thing to her interviewer that she expressed
Wilson to NAWSA (February 28, 1917), NAWSA Records, Box 32, Reel 21.
Paul to State Chairmen (February 8, 1917), NWPP, Reel 2.
to members of the NWP in 1 9 1 7: it was up to the NWP to singularly focus on suffrage
because the National was "working only for war." 169
Paul's charge that NAWSA abandoned suffrage work is totally unfounded. An April
1917 article in the New York Times, running under the headline, "Suffragists' Machine
Perfected in All States under Mrs. Cart's Rule," gave testimony to NAWSA's two-
pronged strategy. The article referenced NAWSA's recent commitment to war service,
but went on to describe the organization's vast political lobbying, publicity activity, and
state campaigning. Specifically, it pointed out that the National's news service sent press
releases to 6,000 newspapers throughout the country and that members in all the states
collected stories of local work and fed them back to the National which then redistributed
them to Washington and New York papers. 170
Cart was quick to capitalize on the political capital earned by suffragists' war
service. An excerpt from one of the NAWSA press releases to the New York Times
demonstrates the manner in which she wedded the issues of suffrage and war service:
In the United States, suffrage associations have illustrated this alertness of women.
Suffragists were already stimulating the production and conservation of food before
any definite governmental action was worked out. And through their suffrage
associations they were passing on the word to other women. What Connecticut
found out was told in Alabama. Nebraska's thrift aroused emulation in New York.
Women in Plattsburgh, New York, and San Antonio, Texas, were of one mind about
being "camp mothers" to soldiers . . . There has been no sectionalism, there can be
none among women, alike disfranchised, and alike, seeking for the ballot for the
common end of protecting that which is dearest to their hearts. No other group of
people came so readily into line for national service, for no other group seeking
enfranchisement has ever sifted through every class and station of life. Ready-to-
Alice Paul, Alice Paul, Regional Oral History Office, (University of California,
Berkeley: November 1972 and May 1973). Available from the Online Archive of
California; http://ark.cdlib.Org/ark:/13030/kt6f59n89c .
170 New York Times, April 29, 1917.
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This article underscores several important points that Catt thought were critical in the
public relations campaign. It mentions the nationwide spread ofNAWSA's efforts, the
unity of their effort that transcended sectional boundaries, and their willingness to heed
the nation's call for aid while still fighting for equal suffrage.
Wilson did not fail to hold up his end of the bargain, either. Although he did not
advocate for the federal amendment until the year was nearly complete (neither did
NAWSA push him to do so), he made significant contributions to the cause, as will be
shown, through his support of state referenda and the creation of a separate suffrage
committee in the House of Representatives. Partially as a result of the President's aid,
eight more suffrage states were added in 1917. With the support of Representatives from
these states the federal amendment was able to win its first victory in the House on
January 10, 1918. Wilson's actions in 1917 contributed no small amount to that victory.
Wilson and NAWSA Work for State Victories
Catt repeatedly called on the President for support in state suffrage battles in early
1917. In January, she wrote to the President's secretary, Joseph Tumulty, alerting him
that Oklahoma's legislature was about to vote in favor of a suffrage bill. She requested
that Wilson write her a letter that included a statement that he hoped the voters in the
state would approve the amendment. On the same day, she sent another letter to
171
Catt, "Ready for Citizenship" (August 24, 1917), NAWSA Records, Box 82, Reel
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Tumulty explaining that a somewhat different bill was pending in North Dakota.
Implying that she and the President were in accord on the issue, she requested, "A letter
of congratulations from the President and an expression of approval of this form of
legislation, together with an expression of his continued interest in the suffrage
movement and hope for its ultimate establishment would be of great assistance to the
cause in general and serve the purpose of which we spoke." 173
Wilson responded quickly, conforming to Cart's specific wording requests in both
cases. In his letter of congratulations regarding the successful North Dakota vote, he
wrote, "As you know, I have a very real interest in the extension of the suffrage to
women and I feel that every step in this direction should be applauded." 174 Cart's use of
the phrase "of which we spoke" and Wilson's phrasing "as you know" indicates a level of
high agreement and cooperation between the two.
Wilson also lent his support to campaigns in Maryland and Maine, but in the most
important state campaign, New York, Wilson was particularly active. Like Cart, he
weaved the issues of democracy, war service, and suffrage into his statements and letters.
To a letter from the head of the New York Woman Suffrage Party, Vira Whitehouse,
asking for a declaration of his support, he responded, "I hope that the voters of the State
ofNew York will rally to the support ofwoman suffrage by a handsome majority. It
would be a splendid vindication of the principle of the cause in which we all believe."
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When Whitehouse wrote back to thank Wilson for his supportive words, she informed
him that New York suffragists were suffering,
-from the very general disapproval of the
course of the pickets, over whom, of course, we have no control and whose methods
deeply deplore. Your message should help as much as anything to show the voters of
New York State the fair attitude to take." 176
Taking into account the obstacle of the pickets, Wilson wrote to Catt in October
again expressing his support for the campaign in New York. He included a statement,
"May I not say that I hope that no voter will be influenced in his decision with regard to
this great matter by anything the so-called pickets may have done . . . Their action
represents, I am sure, so small a fraction of the women
. . . that it would be most unfair
and argue a narrow view to allow their actions to prejudice the cause itself. ,,l7? Catt was
quick to give the President's letter a wide circulation in the New York newspapers.
Just a few weeks before the vote in New York, Wilson met with Whitehouse and a
delegation of 1 10 members of the New York State Woman Suffrage Party. His statement
to them represents the climax of his connecting the war, women's service to the country,
and the right to full citizenship. So sweeping were his words that some even saw it as his
first public endorsement of the federal amendment. His statement, printed in the New
York Times on October 26, read, in part, "I am free to say that I think the question of
175
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letters to Maryland and Maine, see Wilson to Tumulty (April 24, 1917), Life and Letters,
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woman suffrage is one of those questions which lie at the foundation [of the struggle for
democracy]." He added, "I believe that, just because we are quickened by the questions
of this war, we ought to be quickened to give this question of woman suffrage our
immediate consideration
... I think the whole country has appreciated the way in which
the women have risen to this great occasion [of the war]." 179 The suffrage amendment
passed in New York two weeks later by a margin of 94,000 votes. The New York victory
alone dramatically increased the number of representatives in Congress from suffrage
states.
Wilson was also instrumental in breaking up a major administrative obstacle for the
suffragists. For years, suffragists had been forced to plead their case for a federal
amendment with the House Judiciary Committee because the House leadership had
refused to establish a separate committee on woman suffrage. The Senate had established
a separate committee in 1913 and both suffrage organizations were convinced that their
interests had been treated more fairly and with greater attention in the Senate than in the
House. In May, NAWSA executive secretary Helen Gardener wrote to Wilson and asked
him to intervene on NAWSA' s behalf with Representative Pou who, as chairman of the
Rules Committee, held the necessary influence to create a separate suffrage committee.
Pointing out that this was the only request NAWSA had made during the "war session"
of Congress, she implored the President to come to her aid. Gardener, too, made use of
women's war service by adding, "With this added bit of legislative machinery working in
179
Wilson's Statement to New York State Woman Suffrage Party delegation
(October 25, \9\1),LWWP.
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our interests, as occasion permits, we can all the more freely and happily give of our
services in other directions to our country." 180
In a very polite and carefully worded letter, Wilson complied with Gardener's
request and endorsed the idea of a separate committee to Pou. The Congressman
responded that he would heed the President's advice and hold a vote on the matter with
the Rules Committee. The committee ruled favorably on the resolution on June 6. 181
Still, the creation of a new committee had to be approved by vote of the full House.
Gardener again called on the President to use his influence. She asked that he try to
persuade Representative Heflin or Glass, both Democrats, to vote in favor of the
1 82
measure. Wilson again complied and was successful.
He wrote to Heflin, urging him to support the new committee. The representative
from Alabama wrote back that he personally favored a states' rights approach to suffrage,
but, "after reading your letter several times and thinking over the situation, I have
concluded to follow your suggestion and not oppose the creation of a committee in the
House on Woman Suffrage." The House finally voted and approved the new
committee by a close vote on September 24. Wilson's contributing role in this matter
was of no small significance. With a separate committee in place, the federal amendment
moved more smoothly through the committee process in late 1917 resulting into its
l8U
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favorable report and eventual suecessful vote in the House in January 1918. By
convincing Pou to push the creation of the committee and convincing Heflin to cast an
affirmative vote, the President played a major role in one of the crucial battles of the
larger federal amendment war.
In his struggle to ensure the autonomy of U.S. troops in Europe and his ongoing
struggles with Congress over other pieces of war legislation during the summer of 1 9 1 7,
Wilson was unwilling to support suffrage as a war measure. When members of the
NWP, accompanied by representatives of the Progressive, Labor, and Socialist
movements, urged him in May to press the federal amendment at the existing session of
Congress he refused. 184
Catt declined to join the May deputation to the President and, in fact, declined to ask
him to push the federal amendment at all during the "war congress." In July, though,
Gardener wrote to Wilson advancing NAWSA's wish that he would use his opening
speech to the new Congress in December to support the federal amendment as a war
measure.
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Again, the president complied with NAWSA's wishes. His speech to
Congress on December 3 rd urged the passage of the federal amendment during the
• 1 86
upcoming session.
SUMMARY OF 1917
The President's primary focus during 1917 was U.S. entry into the war. Suffrage
histories sometimes miscalculate the relative importance of their subject. Wilson's
Diary Entry (May 14,1917), Life and Letters, Vol 7.
Gardener to Wilson (July 19, 1917), NAWSA Records, Box 32, Reel 21.
New York Post, December 4, 1917.
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attitude toward suffrage during 1917 must be placed into context with the larger issues he
faced
- issues that had the potential to affect the entire world. To the extent that he did
involve himself with suffragists, he did so in concert with Call's vision for securing the
federal amendment and in spite of the hostile actions of the NWP. Wilson and Cart's
vision for the proper suffrage strategy changed over the course of 1 9 1 7 as events
unfolded, but their vision evolved together, through constant and careful correspondence.
The evidence suggests that there were three decisions NAWSA made in 1917 that
contributed to the eventual success of the federal amendment. First, they led the charge
in denouncing the militancy of the NWP. By doing so, they were able to distinguish
themselves from the White House pickets that the majority of Americans (and, more
importantly, members of Congress whose votes would eventually be needed) abhorred.
Secondly, they recognized the need to win more suffrage states before they could
have a chance at success at the federal level. Knowing that the President and Congress
would not, in all likelihood, give the federal amendment serious consideration during the
"war congress" they chose to focus their efforts on state campaigns. As a result, they
won victories across the nation and dramatically increased the number of Congressmen
responsible to equal suffrage constituents.
Finally, they chose to actively support the war, simultaneously strengthening their
own hand and the hand of the President when it came time to stake their claim as equal
citizens. To be sure, Catt and other NAWSA leaders recognized that suffrage was a right
they deserved apart from their war service - most had been working for suffrage for
multiple decades. Still, the reality of the situation dictated that they use all expedient
arguments to support their claim. Right or wrong, the fact of women's tremendous
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contributions to the successful prosecution of the war was a major contributing factor in
the nation's willingness to support the federal amendment.
What was the result of these three critical decisions? By the end of 1917, eight more
suffrage states had been added to the national total. The President's support in the state
campaigns had been critical to their success. Likewise, his influence had helped to secure
a separate committee on woman suffrage in the House of Representatives. This removed
a major legislative hurdle for suffragists as they attempted to bring the federal
amendment to a vote. Finally, by December, they had succeeded in persuading the
President to lend his voice to the growing chorus that demanded equal suffrage for all
American women through passage of a constitutional amendment.
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CHAPTER 5
WILSON AS AN ADVOCATE: 1918-1919
From the time of his December 1917 speech to Congress, the President never backed
away from supporting the federal amendment. His newfound enthusiasm was consistent
with his behavior throughout the suffrage campaign - it was based on the political value
of the issue. Through the addition of eight more suffrage states, the war being fought in
the name of democracy, and women's massive participation in the home front war effort,
suffrage had gathered momentum as a powerful political issue by January 1918.
Wilson's close advisors communicated a very different message to their leader heading
into the 1918 mid-term elections than they had in the election years of 1914 and 1916.
They expressed concern about suffrage as a political liability if the suffrage amendment
were not passed under a Democratic Congress. As this chapter will show, Wilson did
everything in his power to avoid that liability.
Understanding Wilson's motivation during this time period is a complex endeavor.
His foremost goal, as he told that nation and the world in his January 1918 "Fourteen
Points" speech, was to attain a peaceful, liberal world order. Wilson's vision included
self-determined capitalist nations governed by international law and safe from both
traditional forms of imperialism and revolutionary socialism. He believed that America
had a mission to extend her national values to the rest of the world - a mission that could
only be fulfilled within the stable boundaries of his postwar vision for world order. 187
N. Gordon Levin, Woodrow Wilson and World Politics: America's Response to
War and Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), vii, 5.
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The significance of the 1918 mid-term elections was enormous for Wilson. If the
Democrats lost control of Congress, he knew that he would face tremendous opposition
to American participation in the League of Nations - a key component of the postwar
order. Wilson'
s
strong desire to win votes for Democrats in order to pursue his larger
strategy for the war and the peace that would follow must be seen as the driving force
behind all of his decisions leading up to November.
It is precisely because this particular desire was so strong in Wilson that it is difficult
to determine the degree to which his personal feelings about women as political beings
changed, if at all. As this chapter will reveal, he worked tirelessly to secure the federal
amendment under a Democratic Congress. Was this purely an attempt to strengthen his
party in order to pursue his foreign policy or was there a personal conversion involved?
Wilson's exposure to women in the public sphere had certainly increased during his
six years in the White House. Not only in the form of suffragists, but also as members of
the Woman's Peace Party, the Women's Trade Union League, and the Women's
Christian Temperance Union, the President has dealt with women fully engaged in
matters of political import. As the nation moved into war, he found himself appointing
women to the Woman's Committee of the Council of National Defense and approving
the enlistment of thousands of women in the American Expeditionary Force that
deployed to Europe. 189
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It seems more than plausible to suggest that increased familiarity with women
operating in the public sphere bred in Wilson a newfound respect for women's
capabilities. Perhaps, he finally tested some of those assumptions about women's mental
limitations that his Bryn Mawr graduate student complained of and found them in serious
need of revision. In the absence of any personal writings from Wilson that indicate he
underwent a private conversion that matched his public enthusiasm for suffrage, we are
left only with the proposition that such a conversion may have occurred. Setting aside the
possibility of a private conversion, though, there can be no doubt about his advocacy for
woman suffrage in the public sphere - advocacy that would see both victory and defeat
during the course of his final two years in office.
Victory in the House: January 1918
Months before the first suffrage victory in Congress, Wilson had begun preparing for
the battle that he knew would have to be fought. Throughout the summer and fall of
1917, he corresponded back and forth with members of his cabinet and suffrage
advocates trying to determine where the House and Senate stood if the measure were to
come up for a vote. 1 0 His major concern during the months leading up to the start of the
65 th Congress was that the measure would be put to a vote before the necessary
affirmative votes were secured. Pro-suffrage Congressmen and Senators succeeded in
blocking any premature votes in December, and by the first week of the new year, it was
fairly evident that the first vote would come in the House on January 10.
190 See Wilson to Burleson (July 19, 1917), J.A. H. Hopkins to Wilson (July 18,
1917), Gardener to Wilson (July 19, 1917), Maud Wood Park to Wilson (November 30,
1917), and Tumulty to Wilson (December 12, 1917), LWWP.
Two days before the vote, the women's representative of the Democratic National
Committee, Elizabeth Merrill Bass, who had been in elose communication with Wilson
for several months, wrote to encourage Wilson to amplify his December message of
support for the amendment. She made the political implications clear, urging, "Do not let
us give [the Republicans! the advantage of our silence to carry with them into the
congressional campaigns next year when asking for the votes of the enfranchised
women."
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In a theme that she would repeat for the next year, Bass stressed to the
President the political importance of a suffrage victory under a Democratic Congress.
Wilson heeded her advice. He made himself available to a group of Democratic
members of the Suffrage Committee the following day and voiced his support for the
federal amendment. After the meeting, the Representatives handed a statement to
members of the press that read, "The Committee found that the President had not felt at
liberty to volunteer his advice to members of Congress in this important matter, but when
we sought his advice he very frankly and earnestly advised us to vote for the amendment
as an act of right and justice to the women of the country and the world." 192 The New
York Times ran their story about the meeting under the headline "Wilson Backs
Amendment for Woman Suffrage."
The House of Representatives voted on the measure the following day. As the table
below indicates and as Catt and NAWSA had always maintained, bipartisan support was
a key element in the victory:
Bass to Wilson (January 8, 1918), LWWP.
Press Statement (January 9, 1918), Life and Letters, Vol. 7.
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Yes No
Republicans 165 33
Democrats 1 04 jq2
Miscellaneous 5 \
Total 274 136
The final vote was less than a fraction over the necessary two-thirds. 193 With high hopes
for a quick victory, suffragists turned their attention to the Senate. Despite Herculean
efforts by the President, their hopes for a Senate victory were not to be realized for more
than a year.
First Vote in the Senate
From January to October 1918, the Senate vacillated on whether or not to vote on the
suffrage amendment. Predictions about the outcome were so close that calling for a vote
was extremely risky for both sides. When it looked as if it might pass, anti-suffrage
Senators would filibuster to block a vote. When it appeared that it would fail, they would
rush to try and get the measure voted on. Wilson campaigned zealously throughout the
eight-month period between victory in the House and the first vote in the Senate. The
main point he used to try and persuade reluctant Senators to vote for the amendment was
that the Democrats might lose control of Congress if the suffrage amendment did not pass
before the November 1918 mid-term elections. Wilson repeatedly wrote to Senators that
he needed Democrats to maintain control of Congress in order to successfully prosecute
the war and ensure a lasting peace in the post-war settlement.
Despite his full desire for the amendment to pass, Wilson was constrained in his
advocacy by several factors. First, he recognized that the line between executive interest
193 HWS, 636-637.
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and executive interference was both highly sensitive and extremely thin. His
correspondence with Senators during the spring and summer of 1918 demonstrates that
he struggled mightily with how far and how hard he could push without crossing that line
and creating a negative backlash against the amendment. Secondly, he fully realized the
pressure that Southern Democrats were under to protect white supremacy by opposing the
amendment. Knowing that they may face dire consequences in future elections, Wilson
attempted to provide cover for Southerners who would be willing to support suffrage.
Finally, Wilson was aware that dedication to continued white supremacy was only
part of the issue for some Southern senators. Despite the intense efforts ofNAWSA and
NWP leaders to not allow the suffrage movement to become entangled with other
progressive issues, the overlap in membership between suffrage groups and other
progressive interests such as the prohibition and child-labor movements made the
entanglement impossible to avoid. Leaders of the liquor and cotton textile industries
feared that women voters would provide massive support to progressive legislation that
would curtail their ability to turn a profit.
For Senators who came from states in which those interests had the most power,
support for suffrage was political suicide. Though they often publicly emphasized their
raciest opposition to suffrage over economic interests, Wilson was not ignorant of the
additional reasons beyond race for their opposition to a federal amendment. Nor did he
choose to push those particular senators with as much vigor. As the record shows, he
focused his efforts on those Democrats who did not have to answer to powerful industry
lobbyists.
108
In March, Tumulty received word from the Senate that the suffrage amendment
would be brought to a vote within the next few days. He wrote a memo to Wilson
voicing his fears that the amendment would not pass and that its failure would be laid at
the feet of the Democratic Party. Indicating the continued importance ofNAWSA's
close relationship with the Administration, Tumulty informed the President that Catt had
called and expressed hope that the two Senators from Florida might vote in the
affirmative if Wilson asked them to do so. Wilson responded that he "would weaken my
influence in a score of directions if I were to depart from the rule I have set myself and
send for Senators, but I am eager to advise them to vote for the amendment if they will
themselves give me an opportunity to do so." 194 Anxious to not violate senatorial
courtesy, he encouraged Tumulty to devise a way for the Senators to come to the White
House without being "called."
In a letter that sheds fascinating insight into the lengths to which a president will go
to not cross the line between interest and interference, Tumulty wrote back to Wilson
with an elaborate plan to get Senator Fletcher from Florida to come see the President
without having it appear that Wilson had ordered him to the White House. Tumulty met
with the pro-suffrage Senator Hollis and together they devised a plan that Tumulty then
passed along to Wilson:
You [should] send for Senators Fletcher and Ransdell, both of whom are members of
the Committee on Commerce, which Committee has recently been investigating the
Shipping Board and Hog Island. Senator Hollis understands that you have not talked
over shipping matters with Fletcher and Ransdell for some time and that they will be
able to give you some valuable information that may speed up the shipping
programme. They are both great friends of the Administration and are anxious to
serve. You might very properly send for them at once to discuss the speeding up of
194
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he shipping programme. If you do this, Senator Ransdell will call your attention tothe situation in connection with suffrage and will give you a most excellent chance todiscuss it with Senator Fletcher. Senator Trammell [from Floridal has stated that if
Senator Fletcher votes for suffrage, he will also. This will enable us to put the matter
over this week.
Tumulty's letter is instructive for a number of reasons. First, it shows that senatorial
courtesy was not just an excuse that the President used to avoid openly pressuring
Senators to vote in a particular way - a charge repeatedly leveled by the NWP. If
Tumulty and Wilson, in their private correspondence, were willing to go to these lengths
to respect the need for Senators to at least appear independent, then the fear of crossing
that invisible line was surely real and not just a convenient excuse for inaction.
Secondly, it indicates the tremendous amount of coordination that was required among
Wilson, his staff, NAWSA leaders, and pro-suffrage Senators to try and secure the
federal amendment. Winning suffrage in the Senate was no small task.
The vote in March was blocked by opponents who feared that the resolution might
pass. The next time a vote appeared on the horizon was early May. Following a request
from Catt and similar urging from Bass, Wilson wrote to seven Senators urging them to
support the amendment. The letters show his struggle to secure their support without
alienating them through pushing too hard. To Senator Wolcott of Delaware he typed, "I
am writing this letter on my own typewriter (notwithstanding a lame hand) in order that it
may be entirely confidential and may not in the least embarrass you if you should find
195 Tumulty to Wilson (March 14, 1918), LWWP. There is nothing in Wilson's
papers to indicate that this meeting ever actually took place, however, a rumor circulated
in the press that Wilson had swung over two unnamed Southern Democrats and that the
amendment would pass if brought to a vote. Opponents blocked the vote based on those
rumors. If the rumor was based on Senators Fletcher and Trammell, it appears to have
been unfounded. Both Senators voted "nay" each time the measure came up in the
Senate (October, 1918 and February and June 1919).
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that you cannot yield to this very earnest request." 196 He went on to make a convincing
connection between passing the suffrage amendment and winning Democratic victories in
the mid-term elections. His letter concluded, "The next Congress must be controlled by
genuine dependable friends; and we may lose it, - 1 fear we shall lose it, - if we do not
satisfy the opinion of the country in this matter [of suffrage] now." 197
The rest of the letters Wilson sent carried a similar message. The replies he received
indicate the many fronts on which he had to fight the suffrage war. Senator Beckham of
Kentucky said that he opposed the federal amendment because it violated the principle of
states' rights and because he was personally opposed to women having the right to vote.
Senator Tillman of South Carolina replied by saying that the women of his state did not
really want the vote and that he would not be a party to forcing it on them. A similar
reason was offered up by Senator Pomerene of Ohio who pointed out that he had
personally voted for a state amendment when serving in the Ohio legislature, but that the
amendment had been defeated in his state. Like Tillman, Pomerene argued that he would
be contradicting the will of his constituents if he supported the federal amendment. From
Florida came replies from Senator Fletcher that he did not believe suffrage was an issue
that would hurt the Democrats in the upcoming election and from Senator Trammell who
claimed only that he had already pledged to his constituents to oppose the amendment.
196 Wilson to Wolcott (May 9, 1918), LWWP.
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In addition to these objections, Wilson heard from Senator Overman of North
Carolina who made it very clear why he could not vote for suffrage. In addition to
offering up the same reason as Tillman and Pomerene, Overman wrote, "I am sure it will
be exceedingly unwise at this time, from a political standpoint, for a North Carolina
Senator to favor the passage of this measure, as our people believe it might result in a
very dangerous inroad into our social condition, if adopted, and would give us a great
deal of trouble in the future." 199 Overman's reference to the threat of black voters was
clear. What he did not say, but what was surely a part of his thought process, was the
way the powerful cotton textile industries would be alienated by his support of suffrage -
the passage of which they saw as directly connected to increased federal regulation of
cheap child labor.200
Wilson, exasperated over the situation, sent an uncharacteristically curt letter to Bass
in late May. Bass had written the President expressing her belief that there were at least
six senators who could be influenced to change their votes if the President would make
an appeal to them. As always, she mentioned the difficulty of winning the mid-term
elections if suffrage did not pass. Wilson wrote back, "It was supposed as you say in
your letter . . . that there were 'half a dozen possibilities' in the Senate from whom we
might draw sufficient support to put the federal amendment through, but as a matter of
fact I have done my best to draw from that half-dozen and have utterly failed."
199 Overman to Wilson (May 21, 1918), LWWP.
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Unable to secure the necessary votes in May, suffragists were able to get their
advocates in the Senate to delay the vote again. With this additional time to garner
support, they began to push Wilson to support the amendment as a war measure. They
hoped that the pressure of a war measure would either cause at least two Senators to
change their votes in order to not appear unpatriotic or that Southerners could argue to
their constituents that threats to national security were more important than threats to
white supremacy.
While Bass continued to communicate her fears about the mid-term elections,
Wilson also began to hear the same fear from other corners. U.S. Representative Jouett
Shouse of Kansas wrote to convey his concern that a defeat for suffrage in the Senate
would do serious harm to the re-election bids of Democrats in the suffrage states. Shouse
called for Wilson to make another public statement of his support for the amendment and
his encouragement of Democratic Senators to vote in its favor. On the same day, Cart
also wrote to the President urging him to make a public statement that granting equal
suffrage in the United States was critical to the successful prosecution of the war under
the stated aim of making the world safe for democracy.
Wilson chose to make his public statement through a publicity mechanism provided
by Catt. The French Union for Woman Suffrage had written to him in February asking
for an expression of his opinion on woman suffrage. He drafted a response that he
submitted to Catt for her review on June 7. Catt wrote back indicating her general
approval of the letter but asking that he add one crucial sentence: "As America's answer
201
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to this question, it is my earnest hope that the Senate of the United States will pass the
suffrage amendment to our federal constitution before the end of this session." Wilson
rewrote his response with the new sentence inserted exactly as Catt had written it, and the
letter was reproduced in all the major newspapers in mid-June.203
Hoping to capitalize on the publicity from the letter to the French women, pro-
suffrage Democrats tried to call for a vote in late June. Wilson again wrote letters to
secure the necessary votes. He did not publicly call the amendment a "war measure;"
however, his private correspondence to reluctant senators stressed the link between the
war and granting equal suffrage. To Senator Shields of Tennessee, Wilson stated, "I feel
that much of the morale of this country and of the world, and not a little of the faith
which the rest of the world will repose in our sincere adherence to democratic principles,
will depend upon the action which the Senate takes in this now critically important
matter."
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Despite Wilson's willingness to privately argue for the amendment as a war measure,
he had little success with Southern Democrats. In his reply, Senator Shields not only
rejected Wilson's contention that the adoption of the suffrage resolution would in any
way contribute to the successful prosecution of the war, but also reiterated that racial
fears were controlling him and the majority of his colleagues from Southern states.
Seemingly undaunted, Wilson wrote back to Shields, "I do earnestly believe that our
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action upon this amendment will have an important and immediate influence upon the
whole atmosphere and more of the nations engaged in the war."206 His efforts were in
vain. Shields voted "nay" in October and again in February and June 1919.
With the vote scheduled for June 27, Wilson made himself available to a group of
Senate Democrats who came to ask his opinion on the measure. Like the meeting with
House Democrats before the January vote, this meeting was engineered solely for the
publicity it would again give to the President's message of support. The Senators that
attended were all pro-suffrage already, but they were able to report to the press
afterwards that Wilson had been very enthusiastic about the measure passing under a
Democratic Congress. 207 The effect of this public pronouncement did not have the
intended effect of convincing any reluctant Democrats to change their votes.
What did have an effect was Wilson's request to Senator James of Kentucky to give
up his agreement to be paired with an anti-suffrage senator for the upcoming vote. With
James' agreement, the pro-suffrage forces believed they had enough votes to pass the
resolution. Thanks to Wilson's intervention with James, a victory in the Senate appeared
imminent. Once again, though, opponents of the measure refused to let it come to a vote
for fear that they would not be able to secure its defeat.
The Senate then adjourned until the beginning of September. In late August, Wilson
was able to ensure additional support for the amendment by urging the appointment of a
pro-suffrage senator to replace Senator James who had died earlier in the summer.
Wilson to Shields (June 26, 1918), Life and Letters, Vol. 8.
Appointment books (June 24, 1918), Life and Letters, Vol. 8.
Wilson to James (June 24, 1918), Life and Letters, Vol. 8.
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Wilson maintained a close correspondence with Governor Stanley of Kentucky who had
the responsibility of appointing James' successor. In his initial letter to Stanley, the only
issue that he mentioned in connection with the appointment was that of suffrage. He
wrote, "It would be of great advantage to the party and to the country if his successor
entertained views favorable to the pending constitutional amendment."209 Stanley
responded that he had appointed George B. Martin to succeed James. He indicated that
Martin was not personally in favor of suffrage, but he was reasonably certain that the new
appointee would defer to the President and support the amendment.210 Indeed, Martin
helped to break the "solid South" by voting "yea" in October.
When the Senate reconvened in September, the vote on the amendment was
scheduled for October 1
.
In concert, Catt and Wilson made a final push to secure the
necessary votes from Southern Democrats. On September 18, Catt wrote to Wilson,
"Every Senator knows that the vote of the Amendment depends upon Mr. Benet [of
South Carolina] and he, if voting 'aye' on the first roll call, would virtually make the
announcement that it will pass."21
1
She went on to implore the President to seek Benet's
vote that she was certain would swing over several other Southern Democrats.
Wilson did his best. He wrote to Benet on the same day that he received Cart's
letter. Additionally, he coordinated a meeting with Benet and the governor of South
zw Wilson to Stanley (August 30, 1918), LWWP.
210
Stanley to Wilson (September 7, 1918), LWWP.
21
1
Catt to Wilson (September 1 8, 191 8), NA WSA Records. Senator Christie Benet of
South Carolina was appointed to the U.S. Senate to fill the vacancy caused by the death
of Senator Benjamin Tillman. Benet only served from July 6 to November 5, 1918 when
an elected successor, William P. Pollock, took office.
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Carolina in the Oval Office on September 23. Benet was strongly opposed, but Wilson
did not give up. He wrote to him again three days later urging the amendment as a war
measure: "On this ground I appeal to you to hold up the President's hands at the time of
all times when his responsibility to his own country and his obligations to the cause of
world-democracy weigh most heavily upon him."212 Again, Wilson's efforts went
unrewarded as Benet voted "nay" just four days later. During his final correspondence
with Benet, Wilson also made one last appeal via telegram to five other Southern
Democrats, all ofwhom refused to change their positions.213
The senate recessed over the weekend of September 28-29 with the vote scheduled
for Tuesday, October 1
.
Knowing that they were two votes short of the two-thirds
majority required for passage, Cart dashed off a desperation letter to Wilson on Sunday
morning. She informed him that the only way she could see to secure two more votes
was for the President to publicly endorse suffrage as a war measure. Catt asked the
President to write a letter stating his support of suffrage as a war measure so that the
letter could then be printed in the newspapers prior to the Senate vote. She hoped,
although did not guarantee, that this step by Wilson would swing two senators around in
support of the resolution.214
It was a busy Sunday for Wilson. In addition to receiving Catt's letter, Treasury
Secretary McAdoo personally called on the President to urge him to appear before the
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Senate on Monday and make a final appeal for the suffrage amendment. Two pro-
suffrage Senators came to see him in the afternoon voicing their support for McAdoo's
suggestion.215 Despite his fear that such an act might cross the fragile line into the realm
of executive interference, Wilson decided that it was the only hope for securing the
needed votes. He apparently believed that some Southern Democrats would feel safer
explaining an affirmative vote to their constituents if they could say that they had been
following the wishes of the President.
Wilson's speech to the Senate was a public pronouncement of his support for
suffrage as a war measure. He said that the amendment's adoption was "clearly
necessary to the successful prosecution of the war and the successful realization of the
object for which the war is being fought."216 In addition, it served as a testimony to the
way women's war service had strengthened the President's hand. He made repeated
references to the injustice of withholding the full rights of citizenship from those who had
sacrificed so much in their country's time of need. Finally, he used the speech as a forum
in which he could again distance himself and the mainstream suffrage movement from
the NWP. He went out of his way to say that his decision to support suffrage was in no
way a result of the "voices of foolish and intemperate agitators [that] do not reach me at
all."
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The speech did not have the intended effect. In his memoirs, McAdoo regretted
having the President appear before the Senate. He recalled that the appeal was deeply
resented by those who opposed the amendment and even offended some pro-suffrage
senators who felt that Wilson had indeed crossed over too many lines of senatorial
tradition and respect. 218 Whether senators were offended or not, the vote status did not
change. As predicted, when the votes were cast on the following day, the resolution was
two votes short of a two-thirds majority:
Yes No
Republicans 32 12
Democrats 30 22
Total 62 34
The breakdown of the vote showed that the overwhelming reason for the resolution's
failure was the opposition of Southern Democrats - 19/22 opposed Democrats were from
the South. The three additional Democrats that voted "nay" were staunch anti-
prohibitionists." The need to maintain white supremacy and the power of the cotton
textile industry in the South combined with the power of the liquor industry in certain
northern states was too strong a coalition for even the President to overcome.
Wilson was well aware of the political liability the failure had created for Democrats
from suffrage states facing re-election the following month. He was also aware that his
218
William Gibbs McAdoo, Crowded Years: The Reminiscences of William G.
Mcadoo (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1931), 498.
219 Morgan, 126. Anti-Prohibitionists were Senator Reed of Missouri, Senator
Hitchkock ofNew Hampshire, and Senator Pomerene of Ohio. For details of their
activity as "wets," see Ibid., 165. It is interesting to note that there is no record of Wilson
directly trying to influence two of these three Senators, suggesting that he was
sympathetic to their need to not alienate the political support they received from the
liquor industry.
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plans for the post-war settlement depended greatly on maintaining a Democratic majority
in Congress. In an angry letter to Senator Williams of Mississippi in the days
immediately following the vote, he wrote, "I must frankly say that I was very much
grieved that the Senate did not respond to my appeal about woman suffrage the other day,
because I knew what I was talking about when I spoke of the effect it would have upon
our moral influence on the other side of the water and the effect is going to be very
serious."
220 As the mid-term elections would show, the effect was serious, indeed.
The 1918 Mid-Term Elections
Voters went to the polls on November 5 and, for the first time in decades, restored a
Republican majority in both the House and the Senate. In the House, Democrats lost 23
seats. Republicans gained a 49-47 advantage in the Senate by garnering six seats and
only losing one. Suffrage was an issue in some of the Congressional campaigns, but
other powerful currents also caused a backlash against the Democratic Party. Chief
among them were Wilson's post-war peace plans that violated the isolationist sentiments
of many Western voters. Democrats also wrestled with the strong perception among
mid-Western wheat farmers that the Wilson administration showed favoritism to the
South by fixing wheat prices to their detriment but allowing cotton prices to go
22
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unregulated to the tremendous profit of Southern cotton growers.
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The October Senate defeat of the suffrage bill caused both NAWSA and the NWP to
alter their traditional election year strategies for the 1918 mid-term elections. NAWSA
launched campaigns against anti-suffrage Senators in New Hampshire, New Jersey,
Massachusetts, and Delaware. Catt made it clear that this was not a break for their policy
of remaining non-partisan - they campaigned against Democrats and Republicans alike -
but that it was a deeper plunge into the political fray than the National had previously
taken. A more radical policy shift was that taken by the NWP. While continuing their
campaign to "hold the party in power responsible" by urging Western women to vote
against Democrats, they also decided to work for the election of a Democrat in New
Hampshire who was pro-suffrage and running against the incumbent anti-suffrage
Republican.223
Through their combined - though not coordinated - efforts, the two suffrage
organizations contributed to the defeat of the Republican Senator Weeks in
Massachusetts by the pro-suffrage Democrat David Walsh. When J. Heisler Ball, the
Republican senatorial candidate in Delaware, announced his support for the federal
amendment just two weeks before the election, suffragists successfully threw their entire
energies into defeating the incumbent Democrat, Senator Saulsbury. 224 The required two
th
additional votes in the Senate were now guaranteed for the 66 Congress.
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The question remained whether the Democrats would be able to make one more
effort to pass the resolution during the 65 th Congress and at least claim partial credit for
the victory. The November election also saw state suffrage victories in Michigan, South
Dakota, and Oklahoma, which increased the number of presidential electors for which
women could vote to 339, as compared with only 92 in 1916. The women's vote in the
1920 presidential election would be significant and both parties now began to jockey for
that vote. Democrats had hurt themselves with their failure to pass the amendment in
October. They would inflict further damage to their long-term interests by failing again
in February.
Last Chance for Democrats: February 1919
Wilson was incensed with the refusal of Senate Democrats to heed his call for
passage of the suffrage amendment. The tenor of his correspondence suggests that his
anger was not so much about prolonging the injustice of unequal suffrage, but about the
political damage done to the party. The most pressing thing in the President's mind was
his plan for U.S. involvement in a league of nations after the war. Without a Democrat-
controlled Congress, his ability to execute that plan would be greatly hindered. Without
the support of women voters, winning back the presidency in 1 920 would be almost
impossible.
Even before the mid-term elections, he began to work the Senate again in the hope
that the amendment would pass during a later session of the 65
th
Congress. Less than two
weeks after the failed October vote, he wrote to the Governor of South Carolina in an
attempt to discern the suffrage stance of the newly elected Senator, William P. Pollock,
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that would replace Senator Benet, staling, »] was so deeply disappointed in the action of
Senator Benet about the suffrage amendment ... It is a matter ofme utmost consequence
that the amendment should be adopted by the Senate, and any representations that I can
legitimately make to Senator-select Pollock, I should like very much to convey."225
An early November memo written by Tumulty lor the President outlining the major
issues for the next year further demonstrates the importance of the suffrage issue to
WilsoiVs administration. I fader the heading "things to be attended to at once," Tumulty
listed suf frage as the number one issue. I le explained, "The policy of the Democratic
Party should be to put [the federal amendment] over now and thus obtain the credit for it.
If we wait, the Republicans will surely put it over in March and we will have the name of
defeating it." ' Now that suffrage could serve as a wedge issue between parties, the
stakes over who could claim credit for its passage were considerably raised.
Members of the Wilson Administration were not the only ones to recognize this shift
in political value. Internal NAWSA correspondence indicates that suffrage leaders were
well aware of how each party would try to reap the most benefit for what was, after the
November election, an inevitable victory. When the armistice was signed on November
I 1 , Wilson announced his plans to travel to Paris for the peace conference. C'att's right
hand in the NAWSA leadership circle, Mary I lay, wrote to another NAWSA leader that
she could not believe either party would permit the President to go over to I Europe and
meet the representatives of the other countries, knowing that they had enfranchised their
women and the I fnited States Senate has refused to do it. She confided, "It is an insult to
225 Wilson to Manning (October 10, 1918), Life and idlers. Vol X.
226 Memorandum by Tumulty (November 9, 1918), LWWW
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the President and I should think the Democratic Senators would see that and put the thing
through before he sails. If they do not, they will miss their opportunity."227
Suffrage leaders encouraged the President to press the amendment on the Senate
before he left for Paris - a request with which Wilson willingly complied. In his State of
the Union message, given just days before he sailed for Europe, Wilson said:
And what shall we say of the women, - of their instant intelligence, quickening every
task that they touched; their capacity for organization and cooperation, which gave
their action discipline and enhanced the effectiveness of everything they attempted.
Their contribution to the great result is beyond appraisal. They have added a new
luster to the annals of American womanhood. The least tribute we can pay them is to
make them the equals of men in political rights as they have proved themselves their
equals in every field of practical work they have entered, whether for themselves or
for their country. These great days of completed achievement would be sadly
marred were we to omit that act ofjustice.
Women's war service figured prominently in Wilson's public appeal, but the importance
of suffrage to party politics was the resounding theme of his private appeals.
The Governor of South Carolina had assured Wilson that Senator-select Pollock
would vote in favor of the federal amendment. Consequently, he needed to secure only
one more vote for the measure to pass in the 65 th Congress. Before leaving for Europe,
he focused his efforts on Senator Williams of Mississippi and Senator Gay of Louisiana,
neither of whom agreed to change their positions." He remained in constant contact
227 Hay to Maud Wood Park (November 21,1918), Mary Garrett Hay Papers, Reel
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with Tumulty about the suffrage situation while in Paris, inquiring, "Is their anything else
that I can do that might help to bring about the passage of the suffrage amendment?"230
A confidential letter from Williams to Wilson in mid-January made it clear that his
position was immovable. In addition to the fear of decreased white supremacy in the
South, Williams communicated his ongoing displeasure with the NWP. The NWP had
continued to use militant tactics to pressure Wilson and the Democratic Party to pass the
amendment. Unconvinced that the President was doing all that he could, they had begun
burning his words in elaborate demonstrations in Lafayette Park across from the White
House. A potential candidate to cast the one additional vote in favor of suffrage, Senator
Williams responded to the President's request for assistance by saying that he would
never vote for suffrage "as long as they keep up their infantile and asinine bonfire
performances in Lafayette Park."231 To the bitter end, the tactics of the NWP did more
harm than good for the suffrage movement.
When the amendment finally came to a vote on the Senate floor on February 10, it
was more a formality than anything else. All interested parties were aware that the
resolution was still one vote short of the necessary two-thirds. The only changed vote
from October was that of Senator Pollock who provided the keynote speech. His address
to the Senate was an eloquent tribute to women's war service and to the President's
leadership of the nation during the war. He explained that he felt it was his duty as a
Democrat to heed the President's call and support the suffrage amendment. Additionally,
230 Wilson to Tumulty (January 10, 1918), LWWP.
231 Williams to Wilson (January 15, 1919), John Sharp William Papers, quoted in
Morgan, 136. For details ofNWP activities in January and February 1919, see Lewis to
Mrs. George H. Day (January 20, 1918), NWPP, Reel 2.
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he appealed to his fellow southerners by claiming that white supremacy in the South
would not be threatened by extending suffrage to women. Pollock explained, "The black
man could not control the white man, and the Negro man and the Negro woman
combined can not any the more control the white man and the white woman
combined."232
Despite Pollock's appeal, the outcome was as expected. The amendment failed to
pass by a vote of 63-33, one vote short of the required two-thirds majority. With nearly
three weeks to go before the 65th Congress officially adjourned, pro-suffrage Democrats
scrambled to try and get one more vote. When rumors emerged that they had the votes,
Republicans filibustered to block a vote before Congress adjourned on March 4. Fully
aware of the manner in which party politics were driving the train, Catt later explained:
friendly Democrats [contended | that the Northern opposed Senators were merely
postponing action in order to throw to the Republicans whatever political credit
might accrue from the passage of the Amendment in the Sixty-sixth Congress, and
Republican Senators accusing the Democrats of attempting to cover their years of
opposition to federal suffrage action, by the appearance of support at the eleventh
hour. Both accusations contained much truth, and the sorry fact was that the Sixty-
fifth Congress adjourned with the Amendment not yet submitted.
Barring unforeseen deaths of pro-suffrage Senators, the amendment was guaranteed to
pass in the Republican-controlled 66 Congress. Its failure during the 65
th
Congress was
a defeat for Wilson personally and for the Democrats as a party.
Final Victory in Congress: June 1919
Both parties wanted an early vote on the suffrage amendment during the 66
th
Congress. Wilson and his staff took several actions to try and give credit to the
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Democratic Party for the eventual suffrage victory. First among these was the President's
call for special session of Congress to meet May 19, 1919. Within two days of the
convening of the session, the resolution to send the federal suffrage amendment to the
states for ratification passed in the House by a vote of 304-89.234 As usual, the Senate
was not as swift.
Wilson was back in Europe by the time the 66th Congress convened. In another
attempt to claim Democratic credit for the victory, Tumulty wrote to the President that
suffrage organizations were beginning to publicly declare that victory in the Senate was
not assured, despite what had seemed a guarantee after the November 1918 elections.
Tumulty urged Wilson to secure the vote of Senator William Harris of Georgia, a
Democrat who had been elected largely as a result of Wilson's support during his
campaign. Harris was vacationing in Europe at the time, and Tumulty was convinced
that, if the President could get his vote and have him make a public statement to that
effect, the newspapers would report that it was the Democrats, rather than the
Republicans, that had secured the passage of the resolution.
Wilson met with Harris on May 8, and the newly elected Senator informed him that
he would vote for the federal amendment. Both the New York Times and New York Post
carried stories about Harris' pledge in the days following this meeting in Europe and both
quoted Democratic sources who claimed Harris' vote was the one that would put the
236
amendment through in the special session of Congress.
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As the final vote would show, Republicans would not allow full credit to go to their
opponents. There were four more votes in favor of suffrage on June 4 than there had
been on October 1, 1918. Two votes were from Democrats and two were from
Republicans. The debate over which party should get credit did not end in June 1919.
Just a few days before the Senate vote, when the actual date had been shifted for the third
time, an exasperated Mary Hay summed up the feelings of many suffragists who were fed
up with being the pawns in a game of partisan politics. Hay wrote to a comrade, "All
men are liars - Republican and Democrat - at least they get that way when they go to the
Senate."
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When the roll was finally called in the Senate on June 4, 1919, the results were as
follows:
Yes No
Republicans 40 9
Democrats 26 21
Total 66 30
Senator Pollock's "aye" vote from February had been cancelled by his successor, Senator
Dial, who voted "nay." The four changes from October were Walsh of Massachusetts
and Ball of Delaware - both newly elected with the support of suffragists during the 1918
mid-term elections. These two were joined by Senator Harris who had been persuaded
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by Wilson and Senator Hale, a Republican from Maine who changed his vote because his
state had passed into the ranks of the "suffrage states" since the October vote.238
Victory in Congress, sweet though it was, only meant that suffragists could now turn
their attention to the ratification campaign that needed to be fought in the states. The
Wilson Administration, of course, did its best to put a positive spin on the victory for the
Democratic Party, but those who studied the results of the Senate vote could see that it
was mostly in spite of the Democrats that the resolution passed. Wilson's ability to
influence members of his own party had its limits. When their political survival
depended more on their constituents who feared any threat to white supremacy or their
contributors who feared the economic damage women voters might inflict than it did on
the support of the President, they placed personal interests above the President's request
for support. As a result, the Democratic Party suffered the backlash of pro-suffrage
voters in both the 1918 mid-term elections and the 1920 presidential election.
HWS, 646-648 and Morgan, 140.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
An idealist beginning a journey through the records of the woman suffrage
movement might hope to encounter heroic figures along the way. Knowing that women
were finally granted the right to vote under Woodrow Wilson's administration, one might
jump to the conclusion that the President recognized the contradiction inherent in a nation
founded on natural rights theory withholding equal citizenship from half the population.
He then must have taken decisive and courageous action to correct that wrong. Surely,
Wilson must be one of the heroes. The leaders of the suffrage movement must be heroes,
too. Women who rallied members of both sexes to their cause and, against incredible
odds, succeeded in extending equal voting rights to all women must have acted on the
purest of principles. Women who themselves were less than noble could not have driven
such a noble crusade.
With those types of expectations, the idealist should cancel any plans to actually
begin the journey. This thesis reveals that neither the elected leaders of the country nor
the leaders of the suffrage movement are immune from criticism for their actions.
Wilson, more often than not, acted out of cold political reality rather than out of a sense
ofjustice. Catt, seeking all expedient means to further her cause, was more than willing
to ignore the civil rights' violations committed by the government against the NWP. Paul
wrongly pursued a policy of militant harassment of the President even while he was
exerting his utmost executive influence to secure the federal amendment. Both the
President and the two suffrage organizations were willing to sacrifice the rights of black
citizens in order to gain suffrage for white women. Fortunately, historical analysis is not
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necessarily concerned with identifying heroes and villains. It is, however, concerned
with understanding how and why change occurs. To that end, this thesis contains
important insight into why Congress finally passed the federal suffrage amendment and
what role the President played in that process.
Few scholars disagree with one of this study's fundamental points: Wilson was
converted to supporting the cause of the federal suffrage amendment early in his second
term. Where the disagreement begins is around the questions of what brought about that
conversion and what its eventual effects were on the suffrage amendment's outcome.
Using the analytical framework of executive influence, I have attempted to answer both
of those questions.
Prior to the 1918 mid-term elections, suffrage was not an issue with enough power to
swing a significant number of voters in one direction or the other. With only minor
concessions to the suffrage movement, Wilson was able to win re-election in 1916. His
support for the states' rights plank in the Democratic platform, his vote for the New
Jersey suffrage referendum, and his proclamation of openness to a federal amendment at
the Atlantic City NAWSA Convention were enough to convince most pro-suffrage
Democratic voters that he was an ally. Those same actions were moderate enough to not
alienate anti-suffrage elements within the Democratic Party, especially Southerners
fearful of the federal amendment as a threat to white supremacy.
In a direct rebuke to the NWP campaign strategy in 1916, enfranchised women in the
West demonstrated that they were not single-issue voters. Evaluating Wilson and
Hughes across the spectrum of their policies and beliefs, the majority of women voted in
line with their traditional party affiliations. Those who broke ranks tended to support
Wilson because of his efforts to keep the United States out of the war in Europe.
What changed between the November 1916 election and the start of the 1 9 1 8 mid-
term election campaign season that made suffrage a more powerful political wedge?
First, and perhaps most importantly, the United States became directly involved in war.
NAWSA leaders, following Cart's guidance, made a critical decision to commit their
organization to war service alongside suffrage work. Their contributions to national
defense through home front service strengthened the arguments they had been making for
decades that equal sacrifice deserved equal citizenship. This is not to say that they
explicitly altered the basis of their demand for suffrage. They continued to ask for
suffrage on the basis of natural rights, but they were not above using patriotism as an
additional reason.
Helen Gardener articulated this dual reasoning to Wilson in a letter sent a few
months before the first vote in the Senate. She explained:
We do not ask, and do not want [suffrage] given as a 'reward' for war work and war
sacrifice. Those are our loyal duty and pleasure to give even under the humiliation
of disfranchisement, but how much more whole-heartedly, cheerfully, joyfully we
can and will make those duties our first thought and pleasure when we can feel that
we are a part of the government which we gladly sacrifice so much to protect and to
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make safe! I doubt if even you can grasp how deep that feeling is in women.
Whether women wanted suffrage as a reward or not, that is certainly part of the reason
why male elected officials decided to grant it to them. Wilson increasingly emphasized
women's contribution to the war when he urged members of Congress to support the
federal amendment. Likewise, the Congressional debates on the amendment are filled
239 Gardener to Wilson (June 17, 1918), NAWSA Records, Box 32, Reel 21.
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with pro-suffrage Congressmen heaping accolades on the sacrifices of women engaged in
war service.
The other significant change during 1917 was the increase in the number of suffrage
states. Eight more states had granted women the right to vote, and it was clear to both
parties that, unlike in 1914 and 1916, enfranchised women would make a difference in
the 1918 mid-term elections. The increase in the number of suffrage states was in no
small way connected to Wilson's support. In close coordination with NAWSA - the only
suffrage organization still working on state campaigns - Wilson encouraged state
legislatures across the country to pass suffrage referenda. Shedding his hesitance to
become involved in internal state affairs, he wrote letters, gave statements to the press,
and encouraged individual legislators and governors to extend the franchise to women.
Members of the NWP, and the modern scholars that agree with them, would argue
that the other significant change in 1917 was the militant picketing campaign and
subsequent publicity surrounding the pickets' arrest and imprisonment. The actions of
the NWP, they insist, made it impossible for Wilson to continue to talk about fighting a
war for democracy abroad while denying democracy at home. The civil disobedience of
the pickets was so embarrassing to the Wilson Administration that the President realized
the only way he could remove the NWP thorn from his side was by supporting the federal
amendment.
This thesis has refuted that position. Wilson was troubled by the pickets mostly
because of the embarrassment that they caused to the suffrage movement as a whole. His
correspondence with members of Congress, NAWSA leaders, and the press all indicate
that he hoped the general public's distaste for the pickets would not create irreparable
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harm to the suffrage cause, which he increasingly supported. Moreover, press coverage
of the pickets, especially outside ofNew York and Washington, D.C., was primarily
negative. Only a tiny minority of Americans pressured Wilson to stop the arrests,
imprisonments, and forced feedings ofNWP members. Despite the pickets' willingness
to suffer injustice at the hands of the government, there was no great public outcry at
their mistreatment. Wilson's conversion over the course of 1917 came in spite of the
actions of the militants.
Once Wilson for the first time asked Congress to pass the federal amendment in
December 1917, he never wavered from that position of support. Illustrating the limits of
executive influence, though, the amendment failed to pass in the Senate two times before
finally succeeding under a Republican-controlled Congress in June 1919. This study has
established three factors that constrained the President's ability to influence Congress.
First, he had to wrestle with the thin line between executive interest and executive
interference. Senatorial courtesy required him to tread carefully on the sensitivities of
those he sought to influence. In addition, the solid base of the Democratic Party was
located in the South where woman suffrage seemingly posed a threat to white supremacy.
Wilson recognized that Southern Democrats were under immense pressure from their
constituents to protect white supremacy at all costs. The reality of the situation was that
woman suffrage posed little threat to the Southern political system. In fact, had black
women been as disfranchised as easily as black men had been, the power of white voters
would have doubled when women were given the vote. Nonetheless, fear outweighed
fact. Anti-suffragists convinced voters that woman suffrage would destroy white political
hegemony. Public perception mattered more to Southern Senators than the political
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reality and, despite his best efforts, Wilson was largely unable to overcome their fears of
losing future elections by supporting the federal amendment.240
Finally, Wilson recognized that suffrage had become entangled with a host of other
progressive issues including prohibition and child labor laws. Several Democratic
Senators depended on support from the liquor and textile industries for their political
survival. Those industries, sometimes publicly and sometimes working from the
shadows, continually fed the anti-suffrage movement. Mostly Southerners, these
Senators faced a demand to defend white political hegemony as well as pressure from the
liquor and textile industries to adamantly oppose a federal amendment. Owing more to
the white constituents that elected them and the interest groups that financed their
campaigns, those Senators were immune to pressure from the President. As a result,
Wilson's efforts to swing their votes in favor of the suffrage amendment were in vain.
In the end, party politics and simple electoral math made suffrage an issue worthy of
Wilson's attention and devotion. Under Cart's leadership, NAWSA played the bipartisan
political game more effectively than the NWP. Without alienating the Republican
support that would be required to win in Congress and, later, in the state ratification
campaigns, Catt endeared NAWSA to the President and gained his support in critical
battles for state referenda, the creation of a separate House Suffrage Committee, and,
finally, the federal amendment itself. NAWSA wisely decided to continue pursuing state
referenda. Additionally, they distanced themselves from the actions of the NWP and
240
Wilson, himself, was no champion of black civil or political rights. A southerner
by birth and by ideology, he held similar views of the need for white supremacy in the
South as did the members of his party in Congress. Still, his work on behalf of the
federal suffrage amendment indicates that he felt confident that white supremacy was not
threatened by granting women the right to vote.
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simultaneously engaged in war service and suffrage work. As a result, NAWSA leaders
put the suffrage movement in a position to secure the federal amendment before the end
of Wilson's second term.
A political analysis of the suffrage movement leads to a version of the story that
lacks much inspiration. Watching Wilson come to support the cause only when it
becomes politically significant to do so is less than stirring. Even without actively
seeking heroic figures, though, one cannot help but come across them when studying a
movement that was, at its most grassroots level, about political liberty and democratic
principles.
I continue to find myself inspired by letters like the one from a young suffragist
campaigning alone in Montana who wrote back to the NWP headquarters, "Often I ride
all night from one town to the next. It is very uphill work here in Montana. Every place I
go seems harder. Sometimes I wonder if it is worth all the money and effort, but Miss
Burns said it was one of the most important states so I suppose it is worth while."241
Likewise, one cannot help but be moved by the report from another suffragist that she
was sure Senator Hayden had told her he would vote "yea" on the amendment, but that
she could not remember any of the specifics of their conversation because he was just one
of 1 4 members of Congress she had interviewed on that particular morning.242
Even if it was the result of political compromises and pressures and capitulation to
racism in many cases, that magical day that Beulah Amidon imagined when writing to
her comrades in jail in 1917 did come to pass. Her words, meant to inspire those unjustly
1
Clara Louise Rowe to Mrs. Jay Webster (May 31, 1916), NWPP, Reel 1.
2
Report of Maud Younger (January 17, 1916), NWPP, Reel 1.
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imprisoned for petitioning the government for a redress of legitimate grievances, travel
through the years to remind us of the true basis of the battle: "Can you imagine how it
will be when that amendment actually passes? Sometimes, when I am too tired to think, I
just take a long breath and try to dream of a whole nation politically free - and then
there is nothing too hard to do to make the dream come true."243
Amidon to Picket-Prisoners (August, 23, 1917), NWPP, Reel 2.
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